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Genetic Information, Privacy and Insolvency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Edward J. Janger
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Extract

Biobanks hold out the prospect of significant public and private benefit, as genetic information contained in tissue samples is mined for information. However, the storing of human tissue samples and genetic information for research and/or therapeutic purposes raises a number of serious privacy and autonomy concerns. These concerns are compounded when one considers the possibility that a biobank or its owner might go bankrupt. Insolvency impairs the ability of enforcement regimes, and liability-based regimes in particular, to enforce legal norms. The goal of this essay is to develop guideposts for thinking about private and public enforcement of privacy imposed by donors on tissue samples and/or genetic information when a biobank becomes insolvent.

Type
Symposium
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , Spring 2005 , pp. 79 - 88
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2005

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