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Recent Developments in Health Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

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Extract

In West Virginia, healthy smokers can now sue tobacco companies to require them to fund medical monitoring for health risks associated with smoking. In Blankenship, formally known as In re Tobacco Litigation (Medical Monitoring Case), the Circuit Court for Ohio County permitted a jury to decide the medical monitoring claim, despite the clam’s novelty and controversy. The unanimous jury refused to enforce the plaintiffs’ demands, and the court denied a motion for retrial. This trial was the second attempt of the class action lawsuit; the court had previously declared a mistrial when an attorney used the word “addiction” in front of the jury.

The court certified a class of residents of the state of West Virginia with more than a five “pack-year history” (at least one pack per day for five years) of smoking the defendant tobacco companies’ cigarettes, who did not have any of a list of named smoking-related illnesses, including various cancers and coronary heart disease, and who did not receive health care paid for – or reimbursed by – the state of West Virginia.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 30 , Issue 4 , Winter 2002 , pp. 755 - 763
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2002

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References

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