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Dethroning Choice: Analogy, Personhood, and the New Reproductive Technologies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Hilde Lindemann Nelson
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Extract

There is something about the debate over reproductive technologies of all kinds—from coerced use of Norplant to trait-selection technologies, to issues surrounding in vitro fertilization (IVF), to fetal tissue transplantation—that seems to invite dubious analogies. A Tennessee trial court termed Mary Sue and Junior Davis's frozen embryos “in vitro children” and applied a best-interests standard in awarding “custody” to Mary Sue Davis; the Warnock Committee drew an implicit analogy between human gametes and transplantable organs in its recommendation of a voluntary, nonprofit system for collecting and distributing gametes in the United Kingdom; Owen Jones compares the right to trait-selection to the right to abortion; Robert Veatch once claimed that if a woman had signed an organ donation card and then died while pregnant, she had in effect given consent to the attempt to sustain the pregnancy after her death; John Robertson has argued that contract pregnancy poses no problems we have not already encountered with adoption; and Andrea Bonnicksen has compared the wonders of preembryonic genetic screening to the riches housed in the gold museum in Bogota, Colombia.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , Summer 1995 , pp. 129 - 135
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1995

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