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Legal Protections for the Scientific Misconduct Whistleblower

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Peter Poon
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Extract

Even with thirty years of academic experience under his belt, nothing could have prepared the medical school department chairman for the unexpected and protracted course of events that would follow his allegations of scientific misconduct against an associate professor in his department. In this actual case of scientific misconduct whistleblowing, the university allowed the accused professor to resign, but the chairman persisted in seeking a full investigation of the matter. Under the direction of the Office of Scientific Integrity (OSI) of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the institution eventually reopened the investigation, and concluded that the accused professor had fabricated and falsified data, and had plagiarized the unpublished method of other investigators. Thereafter, the professor agreed to a voluntary exclusion from receiving federal funds for a period of three years.

Despite the fact that the chairman's allegations proved true, his involvement as a “whistleblower” entailed consequences that censured rather than encouraged his behavior.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , Spring 1995 , pp. 88 - 95
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1995

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