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Parental Autonomy and the Obligation Not to Harm One's Child Genetically

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Ronald M. Green
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Extract

Until recently, genetics counselors and medical geneticists considered themselves lucky if they could provide parents with predictive information about a small number of severe genetic disorders. Testing and counseling were indicated primarily for conditions of thithis s sort. Out of respect for the autonomy of parental reproductive decision making, the prevailing ethic of genetic counseling stressed nondirectiveness and value neutrality As summarized by Arthur Caplan, the hallmarks of this stance include

a willingness to provide testing and counseling to all who voluntarily seek it, the presentation of information concerning findings in a manner that is balanced and comprehensible to patients or clients, the fair and balanced presentation of all options for action if a problem is discovered, a willingness to answer all questions asked by those seeking services, and an obligation to protect privacy and confidentiality at all times regardless of societal needs or benefits.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 25 , Issue 1 , Spring 1997 , pp. 5 - 15
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1997

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