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U.S. Supreme Court Ruling in Gonzales v. Oregon Upholds the Oregon Death with Dignity Act

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 March 2021

David Sclar
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Extract

In his State of the Union address on January 31, 2006, President George W. Bush asserted: “for all Americans, we must confront the rising cost of care, strengthen the doctor-patient relationship, and help people afford the insurance coverage they need.” Soon thereafter, the White House National Economic Council released a summary of President Bush's plans for health care reform. The Bush plan argues that increased consumer control over health care purchasing decisions will go a long way to solving America's health care woes. By making patients more value-conscious consumers, the Bush Administration hopes to reduce costs, improve quality and increase competition within the health care sector.

The problem of rising health care costs is not new. In fact, President Bush's statement could have come from any American President in the last fifty years.

Type
JLME Column
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , Fall 2006 , pp. 639 - 646
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2006

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Footnotes

The American Journal of Law & Medicine has been tracking and contributing to the development of health law since its inception at Boston University School of Law in 1975. The journal publishes articles authored by professors, attorneys, physicians, and other health-care professionals on subjects ranging from health law and policy to the legal, ethical, and economic aspects of medical practice, research, and education.

The Harvard Law & Health Care Society is a student-operated health law organization at Harvard University Law School. In addition to contributing to this column, the Harvard Law & Health Care Society also hosts speakers from private practice and academia, presents career panels, and promotes interdisciplinary dialogue with other Harvard University graduate schools.

References

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