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Collective pension schemes and individual choice*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2013

JULES H. VAN BINSBERGEN ,
DIRK BROEDERS ,
MYRTHE DE JONG  and
RALPH S. J. KOIJEN
JULES H. VAN BINSBERGEN
Affiliation:
Stanford GSB, NBER and Tilburg University (e-mail: jvb2@stanford.edu)
DIRK BROEDERS
Affiliation:
De Nederlandsche Bank, Senior Strategy Advisor, Supervision Policy Division (e-mail: dirk.broeders@dnb.nl)
MYRTHE DE JONG
Affiliation:
Ministry of Finance, Senior Policy Advisor, Financial and Economic Policy Directorate (e-mail: m.a.c.jong@minfin.nl)
RALPH S. J. KOIJEN
Affiliation:
London Business School and Netspar (Tilburg University) (e-mail: rkoijen@london.edu)
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Abstract

Collective pension schemes are the dominant form of saving for retirement in the Netherlands. We investigate the introduction of individual choices into a collective pension system without affecting the generally accepted advantages of a collective agreement. Increasing individual choices can be beneficial, as it prevents pension plans from making decisions for the average plan participant that may not be optimal for individual participants. We argue for a system in which individuals choose from a set of low-cost balanced index funds, together with a level of intergenerational guarantees that are exchange-traded. This system maintains the two primary advantages of collective agreements: risk sharing and low implementation costs, while facilitating different risk taking behavior at the individual level. To facilitate individual choices within collective pension schemes, it is important to enhance the transparency associated with intergenerational guarantees to all participants in the scheme, both in terms of their price and quantity. We argue that the current system, in which long-term guarantees are given by the young to the old within a specific fund but not across pension funds, is not transparent and we argue that it can be suboptimal. We propose a system of Pension Guarantee Exchanges (PGEs) that increase transparency and allow pension funds with different age distributions to trade with each other. Knowing the price of such guarantees facilitates the introduction of individual portfolio choices within collective pension schemes.

Keywords

G11G23Defined benefit pension fundspension guarantee exchangesindividual choice
Type
Issues and Policy
Information
Journal of Pension Economics & Finance , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , April 2014 , pp. 210 - 225
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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Footnotes

*

We thank an anonymous referee, Roel Beetsma, Lans Bovenberg, Roderick Molenaar, Theo Nijman, Alwin Oerlemans, Laurens Swinkels, and Coen Teulings for helpful comments and suggestions.

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