Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-m6dg7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T15:59:48.821Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Beyond Structure and Process: The Early Institutionalization of Regulatory Review

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 August 2018

Andrew Rudalevige*
Affiliation:
Bowdoin College

Abstract:

With regulatory reform again on the presidential agenda, the history of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) provides a useful case study of organizational effectiveness. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan charged OIRA with imposing cost-benefit analysis on agency regulations, formalizing a new process of centralized regulatory review. But OIRA’s effectiveness flowed less from a single executive order than from the previous decade of presidential experimentation with regulatory review and Reagan’s continued investment in its institutionalization. This article draws extensively on archival documents to understand how regulatory review established itself as a constant of presidential management through the development of attributes such as staff capacity, organizational complexity, bureaucratic leverage, and reputation. Today’s policymakers should heed broader lessons for enhancing organizational effectiveness: singular structural and procedural changes are necessary, but not sufficient, for achieving reform.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © Donald Critchlow and Cambridge University Press 2018 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago in April 2017. The author is deeply grateful to the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation for its financial support of this research, as well as to those interviewed for this project; Professors Steve Teles and Shannon O’Brien; two anonymous reviewers; and the staffs of the Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan Presidential Libraries and the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland.

References

NOTES

1. McCraw, Thomas K., Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 301.Google Scholar

2. Executive Order 13771, issued 30 January 2017.

3. Executive Order 13777, issued 24 February 2017; and see, inter alia, Executive Order 13772, issued 2 February 2017; Executive Order 13778, issued 28 February 2017; and Executive Order 13789, issued 21 April 2017.

4. Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

5. Davenport, Coral and Friedman, Lisa, “In Rush to Kill Obama Rules, Pruitt Puts His Agenda at Risk,” New York Times, 8 April 2018, A16.Google Scholar

6. See, e.g., Pierce, Richard, “Introduction to the OIRA 30th Anniversary Conference,” Administrative Law Review 63 (2011): 16;Google Scholar Jarrett Dieterle, C., “Regulatory Reform in the 114th and 115th Congresses,” R Street Policy Study 91 (April 2017), available at http://www.rstreet.org/policy-study/regulatory-reform-in-the-114th-and-115th-congresses/.Google Scholar

7. West, William F., “The Institutionalization of Regulatory Review: Organizational Stability and Responsive Competence at OIRA,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 (March 2005): 7693.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Arbuckle, Donald R., “The Role of Analysis on the 17 Most Political Acres on the Face of the Earth,” Risk Analysis 31 (2011): 886–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8. Wallach, Philip and Kosar, Kevin R., “The Case for a Congressional Regulation Office,” National Affairs (Fall 2016): 5668;Google Scholar Glaeser, Edward and Sunstein, Cass R., “Regulatory Review in the States,” National Affairs (Summer 2014): 3754.Google Scholar

9. Moe, Terry M., “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure,” in Can the Government Govern?, ed. Chubb, John E. and Peterson, Paul E. (Washington, D.C., 1989), 268.Google Scholar

10. Shapiro, Stuart and Borie-Holtz, Debra, The Politics of Regulatory Reform (New York, 2013), 20.Google Scholar See also Graham, John D. and Noe, Paul R., “Beyond Process Excellence,” in Achieving Regulatory Excellence, ed. Coglianese, Cary (Washington, D.C., 2017);Google Scholar West, William F., “Inside the Black Box: The Development of Proposed Rules and Procedural Controls,” Administration & Society 41 (2009): 576–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11. Lankford quoted in Tim Devaney, “Trump Weighs Key Pick for Regulatory Rollback,” The Hill, 12 March 2017, available at https://origin-nyi.thehill.com/regulation/administration/323507-trump-weighs-key-pick-for-regulatory-rollback. For a comprehensive review of the scholarly literature on OIRA, see Pasachoff, Eloise, “The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control,” Yale Law Journal 125 (2016): 21822290.Google Scholar

12. West, “Institutionalization of Regulatory Review.”

13. Joe Wright, “Status of Management Reviews - FY 86 budget,” 12 November 1984, National Archives—II, College Park, Maryland [NARA], Record Group [RG] 51, Entry UD-UP 200, OMB Director’s Office Files, Box 3, Folder [Management/Budget Presentations, March–December 1984].

14. Corwin, Edward S., The President: Office and Powers, 4th rev. ed. (New York, 1957);Google Scholar Pious, Richard M., The American Presidency (New York, 1979).Google Scholar

15. Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), 12;Google Scholar see also Hult, Karen M. and Walcott, Charles, Governing Public Organizations: Politics, Structures, and Institutional Design (Pacific Grove, Calif., 1990).Google Scholar

16. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 15.

17. Polsby, Nelson, “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives,” American Political Science Review 62 (March 1968): 144–68;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision (Boston, 1971).Google Scholar

18. Carpenter, Daniel P., Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA (Princeton, 2010), 298, 45.Google Scholar

19. Carpenter, Daniel P., The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 (Princeton, 2001);Google Scholar see also Wilson, James Q., Bureaucracy (New York, 1989).Google Scholar

20. Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents (New York, 1990), 50.Google Scholar

21. See, e.g., Goodman, Marshall R. and Wrightson, Margaret T., Managing Regulatory Reform: The Reagan Strategy and Its Impact (Westport, Conn., 1987);Google Scholar Kerwin, Cornelius, Rulemaking, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C., 2003);Google Scholar McGraw, Prophets of Regulation.

22. See Office of Management and Budget, “Issue #1: Quality of Life Review,” Issue Papers: Environmental Protection Agency, 1974 Budget, n.d., available at http://thecre.com/ombpapers/QualityofLife2.htm.Google Scholar

23. Tozzi, Jim, “OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding,” Administrative Law Review 63 (2011): 3769;Google Scholar see also Joe Greene Conley III, “Environmentalism Contained: A History of Corporate Responses to the New Environmentalism” (PhD diss., The Program in History of Science, Princeton University, 2006); Percival, Robert V., “Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory Decisions?” Fordham Law Review 79 (2011): 24872540.Google Scholar

24. The paper was by Michigan State’s Allen Schmid, then consulting for the Pentagon. See Fuchs, Edward P. and Anderson, James E., “The Institutionalization of Cost-Benefit Analysis,” Public Productivity Review 10 (Summer 1987): 2533;CrossRefGoogle Scholar author interview with Jim Tozzi, 22 March 2017; Conley, Environmentalism Constrained, 164.

25. Eads, George C. and Fix, Michael, Relief or Reform? Reagan’s Regulatory Dilemma (Washington, D.C., 1984), 4748;Google Scholar on central clearance, see Rudalevige, Andrew, Managing the President’s Program (Princeton, 2002), chap. 3.Google Scholar

26. Director to Heads of Departments and Agencies, “Agency Regulations, Standards, and Guidelines Pertaining to Environmental Quality, Consumer Protection, and Occupational and Public Health and Safety,” memo of 5 October 1971, available at http://thecre.com/ombpapers/QualityofLife1.htm.

27. Notably John Whitaker and Richard Fairbanks. Author interview with Jim Tozzi.

28. As quoted in Meghan Twohey, “Jim Tozzi: On Jazz and OMB,” The Federal Paper 1 (18 November 2002).

29. Tozzi, “OIRA’s Formative Years,” 48.

30. Alvin L. Alm to Jim J. Tozzi, “Interagency Review of EPA Regulations,” memo of 1 November 1976, available at http://thecre.com/pdf/QualLifeReview7.PDF. Tozzi agreed that “EPA was right” that it received by far the most attention. “That’s a fair criticism.” He notes, though, that OMB only had five staff people working on QLR and thus expanding the review was not feasible (author interview with Jim Tozzi.).

31. Quoted in Eads and Fix, Relief or Reform?, 49.

32. John R. Quarles Jr., acting administrator, to EPA assistant administrators et al., “Termination of the Quality of Life Review,” memo of 25 January 1977, available at http://thecre.com/pdf/QualLifeReview8.PDF. See also Percival, “Who’s in Charge?”, 2498.

33. Eads and Fix, Relief or Reform?, 49. A 1974 internal OMB memo suggests that even OMB staff were befuddled at times: “The logic of the current regulatory review procedure escapes me,” one analyst wrote, “i.e. the procedure wherein EPA is required to disclose all its information . . . [to] other agencies but OSHA is not required to do the same.” Glenn Schleede to Mike Duval and Jim Cavanaugh, “Vinyl Chloride Standards,” memo of 1 October 1974, Gerald Ford Library [GFL], White House Central Files, Subject File FG 6-16, Box 62.

34. CWPS was created by Public Law 93-387, replacing the Cost of Living Council; Executive Order 11821, issued 27 November 1974, required that “major” legislative and regulatory proposals “must be accompanied by a statement which certifies that the inflationary impact of the proposal has been evaluated.” Inflation Impact Statements were renamed Economic Impact Statements by Executive Order 11949, issued 31 December 1976.

35. Eads and Fix, Relief or Reform?, 52; Tozzi, “OIRA’s Formative Years,” 51. By the end of the Ford administration, OMB had, EPA conceded, “recently made efforts to apply the same ground rules to other agencies.” John Quarles Jr. (acting administrator, EPA) to Don Crabill (OMB), letter and attached memo of 25 January 1977, available at http://thecre.com/pdf/QualLifeReview8.PDF. For much of the administration, though, EPA still felt “singled out”; see Percival, “Who’s in Charge?”, 2500.

36. James Lynn to President, “Status of Inflation Impact Statement Initiative,” memo of 19 June 1975, GFL, Philip Buchen Files, Box 11, [Economy—Inflation Impact Statements (1)].

37. Quoted in Fuchs and Anderson, “Institutionalization of Cost-Benefit Analysis,” 28.

38. Hopkins, Thomas J., “The Evolution of Regulatory Oversight: CWPS to OIRA,” Administrative Law Review 63 (2011): 73.Google Scholar

39. Jimmy Carter, “Airline Industry Regulation Message to the Congress,” 4 March 1977.

40. Bert Lance to the President, “Improving the Federal Regulatory Process,” memo and attached material of 23 August 1977, NARA, RG 51, OMB Office of General Counsel, Executive Order and Proclamation Files 1977–79, Box 4, [EO 12044 (T1-9/78.1)].

41. Charlie Schultze to the President, “Economic Impact Analysis,” memo of 7 October 1977. Jimmy Carter Library [JCL], Office of the Staff Secretary, Presidential Files, Container 46, [10/11/77 [2]].

42. Ibid. (emphasis in original). RARG was chaired by CEA and included OMB as well as Treasury, Commerce, Labor, and a group of regulatory line agencies: Agriculture, Defense, Energy, HEW, Interior, Justice, Transportation, and EPA. CWPS provided staff support. Rules for review were selected by a steering committee made up of CEA, OMB, Treasury, Labor, Commerce, and one member, rotating quarterly, from the regulatory agencies.

43. Douglas Costle to the President, “Ensuring Sensible Regulation,” memo of 6 October 1977. JCL, Office of the Staff Secretary, Presidential Files, Container 46, [10/11/77 [2]].

44. Senator Abraham Ribicoff et al., letter to the President, 16 December 1977.

45. James T. McIntyre to the President, “Executive Order on Improving Government Regulations,” memo, attached material, and handwritten comments of 20 March 1978. NARA, RG 51, OMB Office of General Counsel, Executive Order and Proclamation Files 1977–79, Box 4, [EO 12044].

46. Ibid.

47. Stu Eizenstat to the President, memo and attached materials of 2 September 1978. JCL, Neustadt Papers, Box 70. Supported by author interview with CWPS attorney (later OIRA head) Sally Katzen, 11 March 2017.

48. James McIntryre to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, “Evaluation of EO 12044, Improving Government Regulations,” memo of 10 April 1979. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 281, Records of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Information Policy Branch, Box 4, [1.50.10 DO/MIS Executive Orders].

49. Stanley Morris to Richard Cotton, letter of 12 February 1979, and attached materials. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 2, [EO 12044—Department of Health, Education and Welfare].

50. Richard Cotton to Wayne Granquist, letter of 14 June 1979, and attached materials. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 2, [EO 12044—Department of Health, Education and Welfare].

51. Stanley Morris to John White and Wayne Granquist, “Briefing Materials for E.O. 12044 Meeting with the Department of HEW,” memo, n.d. [summer 1979] and attached materials. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 2, [EO 12044—Department of Health, Education and Welfare].

52. Ibid.

53. Eizenstat to the President, memo and attached materials of 2 September 1978.

54. The (slight) increase over time was due to the arrival of Alfred Kahn as the dual-hatted chair of CWPS and special adviser to the president on inflation. See Eads and Fix, Relief or Reform?, 60; author interview with Sally Katzen.

55. Anderson, James E., “The Carter Administration and Regulatory Reform: Searching for the Right Way,” Congress and the Presidency 18 (Autumn 1991): 121–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

56. Dave Mathiasen to Distribution [Jim Tozzi], “New Focus for Spring Planning Review,” memo of 21 February 1980. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 281, Records of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Information Policy Branch, Box 4, [1.31.15 Spring Review Planning and Policy Guidance 1981].

57. Author interview with Jim Tozzi. See, e.g., the proposed Regulation Reform Act of 1979 (introduced as S. 755 and H.R. 3263).

58. Stringham, Luther, “Government Questionnaires and the Federal Reports Act of 1942,” Public Administration Review 3 (Spring 1943): 150–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Note that OMB was known as the Bureau of the Budget from 1921 to 1970.

59. James T. McIntyre Jr. to Douglas Costle, letter of 25 November 1980, and supporting material. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 257, OMB Program Records: Records of Regulatory Policy (OIRA), Box 1, [OIRA-RP-EPA-1980–84, General].

60. Executive Order 12174, issued 30 November 1979.

61. One OMB staffer boasted that EO 12174 was “the most far-reaching reform of paperwork control since enactment of the Federal Reports Act” itself (perhaps a low bar?). See Stan Morris, “Note to the Regulatory Policy and Reports Management Staff,” memo of 25 January 1980, NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 2, [C.6.1 OIRA/HR Creation of RIP].

62. Wayne Granquist, Associate Director, Testimony before House Government Operations Committee, 21 February 1980. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 281, Records of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Information Policy Branch, Box 5, [1.60.20.02 Paperwork Bill, 1/26/80 #4].

63. See Behr, Peter, “If There’s a Rule, Jim Tozzi Has Read It,” Washington Post, 10 July 1981.Google Scholar

64. Stu Eizenstat and Si Lazarus to the President, “Enrolled Bill HR6410, Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980,” memo and supporting material of 10 December 1980. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 281, Records of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Information Policy Branch, Box 5, [1.60.20.02 Paperwork Bill, 1/26/80 #4].

65. Richard Darman to the Cabinet, “Cabinet Matter: Executive Order on Regulatory Management,” draft memo for the President of 2 February 1981. Ronald Reagan Library (RRL), White House Office of Records Management [WHORM] Subject Files: FG—Federal Government Organizations, Box 1, [FG (000068-000088)]. See also Miller, James C. III, “The Early Days of Reagan Regulatory Relief and Suggestions for OIRA’s Future,” Administrative Law Review 63 (2011): 93101.Google Scholar

66. Jim Miller to Ed Harper, memo of 29 January 1981. NARA, RG 51, Office of the Director: Deputy Director’s Subject Files: Ed Harper, 1981–82, FRC 51-82-50, Box 3, [Regulatory Relief]. For other critiques of the Carter program, see Clark, Timothy B., “Substance over Process,” National Journal, 3 January 1981, 28;Google Scholar DeMuth, Christopher, “The White House Review Programs,” Regulation (January–February 1980): 2023.Google Scholar

67. Anderson, “Carter Administration and Regulatory Reform,” 144.

68. James T. Lynn, oral history of 24 February 1997, Gerald R. Ford Library, NLGRF-OH 1997 Feb 24.

69. Quoted in Jarrett Dieterle, C., “Lessons from the Godfather of Regulatory Budgeting,” The Hill, 23 February 2017.Google Scholar

70. B. James, “OMB Examiner’s Handbook: Budget Policies,” draft of 8 July 1981. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 281, Records of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Information Policy Branch, Box 1, [1.02.05 1981–82 OMB Examiner’s Handbook].

71. Peter M. Shane to James C. Miller III, “Draft Executive Order on Federal Regulation,” memo of 29 January 1981. NARA, RG 51, Office of the Director: Deputy Director’s Subject Files: Ed Harper, 1981–82, FRC 51-82-50, Box 3, [Regulatory Relief]; see also Richard Willard to Fred Fielding, “Executive Order on Regulatory Reform,” memo of 6 February 1981, which notes that “a recurring question in regulatory review programs is the power of the President to control the actual content of rulemaking entrusted by statute to particular agencies.” This memo reflects a meeting that day, for which Willard’s handwritten notes suggest that Jim Tozzi was not yet a known force to the Reagan White House—he is identified as “Jim Cozey.” Notes and memo in RRL, WHORM Subject Files: FG—Federal Government Organizations, Box 1, [FG 000089 (2)].

72. For an early draft, see Richard Darman, White House Staffing Memorandum, Document 000089S, 3 February 1981. RRL, WHORM Subject Files: FG—Federal Government Organizations, Box 1, [FG 000089 (2)]. For agency comment, see RRL, WHORM Subject Files: FG—Federal Government Organizations, Box 1, FG (000067 (1)], e.g., Samuel Pierce to Craig Fuller, “Proposed Executive Order/Federal Regulation,” memo of 17 February 1981. See also Miller, James C. III, Fix the U.S. Budget!: Urgings of an “Abominable No Man” (Stanford, 1994), 3.Google Scholar

73. Behr, Peter, “OMB Now a Regulator in Historic Power Shift,” Washington Post, 4 May 1981.Google Scholar

74. Richard Lyng to the Secretary, “Proposed Executive Order on Regulatory Management,” memo of 27 January 1981. RRL, WHORM Subject Files: FG—Federal Government, Organizations, Box 1, [FG (Begin-000066)].

75. Craig Fuller notes of telephone call from John Fowler, 16 February 1981, 10:45 a.m.; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick to Members of the Cabinet, “Executive Order on Federal Regulation,” memo of 16 February 1981. Both in RRL, WHORM Subject Files: FG—Federal Government Organizations, Box 1, FG (000067 (1)].

76. DeMuth, Christopher C. and Ginsburg, Douglas H., “White House Review of Agency Rulemaking,” Harvard Law Review 99 (1986): 1081.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

77. As before, those with annual economic effects of at least $100 million. The OMB director could also define other regulations as “major.”

78. See, among many others, Friedman, Barry D., Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era: The Eruption of Presidential Influence (Pittsburgh, 1995);Google Scholar O’Reilly, James T. and Brown, Phyllis E., “In Search of Excellence: A Prescription for the Future of OMB Oversight of Rules,” Administrative Law Review 39 (Fall 1987): 421–44.Google Scholar

79. Stan Morris, “Note to the Regulatory Policy and Reports Management Staff,” memo of 25 January 1980, NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 2, [C.6.1 OIRA/HR Creation of RIP]; more generally, see Anderson, “Carter Administration and Regulatory Reform”; Tozzi, “OIRA’s Formative Years.”

80. Reagan terminated the CWPS via Executive Order 12288, issued 29 January 1981. The 25-person-strong Office of Statistical Policy and Standards from the Commerce Department was moved to OMB by the Paperwork Reduction Act. An aide to Tozzi told him in December 1980 that Congress expected OMB to absorb the Commerce staff rather than create its own capacity for statistical analysis (and that expanding the OMB staff was tactically helpful anyway given Reagan’s expected executive branch hiring freeze). John P. McNicholas to Jim Tozzi, “Views on Statistical Policy Function under S. 1411,” memo of 1 December 1980. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 281, Records of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Information Policy Branch, Box 5, [1.60.20.02 Paperwork Bill, 1/26/80 #4].

81. Author interview with Jim Tozzi.

82. See, e.g., Jim Tozzi to Linda Smith, “Request to Post ‘Vacancy Announcements’ Against OIRA Vacancies,” memo of 23 February 1981; Jim Tozzi, “Action items resulting from 8:30 meeting with Miller,” notes of 23 February 1981. Both in NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 411, OIRA Information Policy Branch FY1981–82, Box 1, [2.20.15 IP Operating Procedures]. See also Jim Tozzi to Linda Smith, “Need for More Office Space,” memo of 29 January 1981. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 1, [A.2 OIRA/HR 1981–82 Administrative Matters].

83. “Decision Unit 0336: Office of Regulatory and Information Policy,” n.d. (late 1981). NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 1, [A.2 OIRA/HR 1981–82 Administrative Matters]; No author, “Budget Justification for the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,” 27 February 1981. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 411, OIRA Information Policy Branch FY1981–82, Box 1, [2.20.15 IP Operating Procedures]; “Update on Personnel: OIRA,” revised 2 October 1981. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 6, [P.3. Personnel Matters 1981–82].

84. OIRA Reports Management: Human Resources, “Highlights for week[s] ending” 6, 13, 20, and 27 February 1981. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 9, [W.1 Weekly Activities Report, 1981].

85. No author, “Budget Justification for the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,” report of 27 February 1981. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 411, OIRA Information Policy Branch FY1981–82, Box 1, [2.20.15 IP Operating Procedures].

86. However neutral the analysis, of course, it rests on assumptions that have political ramifications—starting with the monetary value of a human life or the “social cost of carbon,” a cost mandated by President Obama and revoked by President Trump (see Executive Order 13783, issued 28 March 2017).

87. Geoffrey White to Jim Tozzi, “EPA Radiation Protection Guidance,” memo of 30 March 1981. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 257, OMB Program Records: Records of Regulatory Policy (OIRA), Box 1, [OIRA-RP-EPA-1980–84, General].

88. “Merit Promotion Program Vacancy Announcement,” 12 October 1979, as well as other similar material and personnel memoranda in NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 6, [P.3. Personnel Matters 1981–82].

89. Draft “Vacancy Announcement,” n.d., included with letter of 23 February 1981. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 6, [P.3. Personnel Matters 1981–82].

90. “Summary of OIRA Professional Staff and Experience,” n.d. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 281, Records of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Box 5, [1.60.20.02 Paperwork Bill, 1/26/80 #4].

91. Jim Miller to All OIRA Staff, “Standard Operating Procedure Memoranda,” memo collating previously issued SOP memoranda, 15 May 1981. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 411, OIRA Information Policy Branch FY1981–82, Box 1, [2.20.15 IP Operating Procedures]. Again, on Standard Operating Procedures as a mainstay of organizational maintenance, see Allison, Essence of Decision, chap. 3.

92. See the materials in NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 6, [M.2 Memos to all 3 Div’s (Tozzi’s) 1981–82], for example C. Louis Kincannon to Clearance Officers of Departments and Agencies, “More recent changes in Reports Management Practices,” memo of 2 February 1981; Kincannon to Jim Tozzi, Gail Coad, John McNicholas, OIRA Desk Officers, “Processing of EO 12291 Submissions,” memo of 2 March 1981; Kincannon to OIRA Desk Officers, “OMB Review of EO 12291 Submissions,” memo of 15 April 1981; Kincannon to IRA Desk Officers, “Write-Ups on Regulations under Review by President’s Task Force,” memo of 6 April 1981. See also Arnold Strasser to Reports Management Desk Officers, memo of 5 November 1981, NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 1, [OIRA/HR 1981-82 Administrative Matters], which notes that “as you know, [OIRA chief] Chris DeMuth is very concerned that we have not been responding to our mail on a sufficiently timely basis.”

93. Robert Bedell to Darrell A. Johnson, “Contracting for Preparation of an OMB Paperwork Control Manual,” memo and attached material of 19 August 1985. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-UP 224, OIRA Program Records, Box 2, [H.6 OMB Paperwork Control Manual].

94. Jim Tozzi to Director, “Implementing EO 12291,” memo (with handwritten addenda) of 3 February 1981. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 6, [M.5 Memos to heads of executive depts. and agencies 1981–82].

95. Jim Tozzi to Jim Miller and Glenn Schleede, “OMB Compliance with Executive Order 12291,” memo and attached material of 18 May 1981. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 281, Records of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Information Policy Branch, Box 4, [1.50.10 DO/MIS Executive Orders].

96. “General Notes: Regulations Received for Review under EO 12291,” status as of 18 March 1981. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 7, [R.4.3 Regulatory Tracking System—Weekly Report to J. Miller 1981–82]. In his own interviews, Samuel Workman found this trick still in play as of the 2010s. See Workman, Samuel, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy in the U.S. Government (New York, 2015), 68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On court cases, see Ed Clarke to Tim Muris, “Pending Lawsuits in EPA,” memo of 7 April 1981; Rick Otis to Bob Bedell, “Summary of EPA’s Amendments to Petroleum Refining Effluent Guidelines,” memo of 14 August 1984. Both in NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 257, OMB Program Records: Records of Regulatory Policy (OIRA), Box 1, [OIRA-RP-EPA-1980–84, General].

97. Interim Regulatory Impact Analysis Guidance (12 June 1981), attached to David Stockman to Rep. Lyle Williams, letter of 16 May 1983. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 257, OMB Program Records: Records of Regulatory Policy (OIRA), Box 1, [OIRA-RP-EPA-1980-84 EO 12291 (previously 12004)]. Costs and benefits were to be broken down as monetary, quantitative but nonmonetary, and nonquantifiable.

98. Pete Modlin to Don Moran et al., “Topics for Spring Planning Review,” memo and attached material of 26 March 1982. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 281, Records of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Information Policy Branch, Box 4, [1.31.15 Spring Review Planning and Policy Guidance 1981].

99. Executive Order 12498, issued 4 January 1985.

100. Jim MacRae to Gail Coad et al., “Talking Points for Cabinet Council Presentation,” memo and attached material of 2 June 1985. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-UP 224, OIRA Program Records, Box 1, [E.5.4 Executive Order 12498, 1985–86]. See also Gramm (2011, 30–31).

101. Granquist testimony before House Government Operations Committee.

102. Quoted in Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era, 60, 35.

103. Jim Tozzi to Program Deputy Associate Directors, “OMB Review of Regulatory Proposals,” memo of 27 February 1981. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 6, [M.2 Memos to all 3 Div’s (Tozzi’s) 1981–82].

104. Judy Egan to Jefferson Hill, “Response to Request for Material for OIRA’s ‘We Need More $$’ Briefing Book,” memo of 6 November 1986. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-UP 224, OIRA Program Records, Box 1, [A.2 Administrative Matters, 1985–86].

105. Likewise at HUD, “budget examiners requested an extension so that they may further explore the budgetary impact of the change.” See Route Slips of 11 July and 3 June 1983, respectively. Both in NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 368, OIRA 1981–84 Division Office, Box 2, [E.2 Extensions, 1983–84].

106. Geoff White to Jim Tozzi, “Extension of EPA Regulations Implementing the Uniform Relocation Act,” memo of 26 March 1982. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-WW 257, OMB Program Records: Records of Regulatory Policy (OIRA), Box 1, [General (#2) OIRA-RP-EPA 1980–84].

107. Jim Miller to Jim Tozzi, “Ideas Stimulated by Desk Officer Responses,” memo of 27 May 1981, NARA, RG 51, Entry 411, OIRA Information Policy Branch, FY1981–82, Box 1, [2.20.15 IP 1981–82 Operating Procedures].

108. Jim Miller to Ed Harper, “Handling Sensitive Regulatory Matters,” memo of 10 September 1981. NARA, RG 51, Office of the Director: Deputy Director’s Subject Files: Ed Harper, 1981–82, FRC 51-82-50, Box 3, [Regulatory Relief].

109. NARA, RG 51, Office of the Director: Deputy Director’s Subject Files: Ed Harper, 1981–82, FRC 51-82-50, Box 3, [Regulatory Relief]; “OMB Regulatory News Bulletin,” 29 October 1982 [item 107789], and “Regulatory Activity Highlights: Significant Regulations Under Review at OMB, Week Ending November 5, 1982” [item 109305], RRL, WHORM Subject Files, FG 006-11 (OMB), Box 2, [FG 006-11 107600-107813].

110. Ed Harper to Ed Meese, “Proposed Actions in Regulatory Reform Area,” memo of November 20, 1981.

111. Joseph R Wright Jr. to Edwin Meese III, “Run on E.O. 12291,” memo of 3 October 1983. RRL, WHORM Subject Files, FG 006-11 (OMB), Box 3, Folder [208300-226737], Document 219282.

112. For instance, in a well-known 1983 dispute with the Labor Department over cotton dust, OIRA was upset by Labor’s incomplete assessment of a 1978 rule setting standards for worker exposure to such dust. The issue went to the Task Force (which favored OIRA), and then to the White House. Labor’s position prevailed, arguably because the administration was under so much political pressure over its regulatory battles with EPA that it didn’t want to open up another front. See Christopher DeMuth to T. Timothy Ryan, letter of 27 January 1983 and attached material. RRL, WHORM Subject Files, FG 006-11 (OMB), Box 3, [FG 006-11 144100-150199], document 144127; Botsch, Robert E., Organizing the Breathless: Cotton Dust, Southern Politics, and the Brown Lung Network, reprint ed. (Lexington, Ky., 2014), 136.Google Scholar

113. Behr, “OMB Now a Regulator.”

114. Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era, 35.

115. Quoted in ibid., 147.

116. Quoted in ibid., 61.

117. James MacRae Jr. to Wendy L. Gramm, “Your Meeting with Debbie Steelman,” memo and attachments of 13 March 1986. NARA, RG 51, Entry UD-UP 224, OIRA Program Records, Box 2, [H.1 Health and Human Services Department, Part II, 1985–86].

118. Ed Harper to Ed Meese, “Proposed Actions in Regulatory Reform Area,” memo of 20 November 1981. See generally Eads and Fix, Reform or Relief?

119. Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era, 5.

120. Ibid., 4, and see also 118.

121. Neustadt, Richard E., “Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance,” American Political Science Review 48 (September 1954): 641–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

122. Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era, 114–16; Gramm, Wendy L., “Regulatory Review Issues, Oct. 1985–Feb. 1988,” Administrative Law Review 63 (2011): 2930.Google Scholar For a systematic analysis of industry lobbying at OIRA, see Haeder, Simon F. and Yackee, Susan Webb, “Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President’s Office of Management and Budget,” American Political Science Review 109 (August 2015): 507–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

123. O’Reilly and Brown, “In Search of Excellence.”

124. Richard Darman handwritten notation on C. Boyden Gray and Michael Boskin to the President, “Proposed Regulatory Reform Initiative,” memo of 23 December 1991. NARA, RG 51, Entry 388, Records of the Director’s Office: Director’s Office Files, 1989–92, Box 5, [Darman Notes 1991].

125. The exchange with Public Citizen Congress Watch attorney David Vladeck is from a Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing on S. 1742, quoted in Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era, 119.

126. Kagan, Elena, “Presidential Administration,” Harvard Law Review 114 (June 2001): 2288CrossRefGoogle Scholar (and see 2288–90).

127. See, e.g., Sunstein, Cass, “The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities,” Harvard Law Review 126 (May 2013): 1838.Google Scholar

128. But for a seminal discussion of such entrepreneurial efforts, see Skowronek, Stephen and Glassman, Matthew, eds., Formative Acts: American Politics in the Making (Philadelphia, 2007).Google Scholar

129. Miller to Harper, memo of 29 January 1981.

130. As noted above, Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era, argues that OIRA was largely pro-business and less than transparent about its contacts with industry lobbies. For a more recent discussion, see Haeder and Yackee, “Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President’s Office of Management and Budget.” For a useful theoretical discussion of “regulatory capture” in this regard, see Carpenter, Daniel and Moss, David A., eds., Preventing Regulatory Capture (New York, 2014).Google Scholar

131. See, e.g., Eilperin, Juliet, “White House Delayed Enacting Rules Ahead of 2012 Election to Avoid Controversy,” Washington Post, 13 December 2013, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-delayed-enacting-rules-ahead-of-2012-election-to-avoid-controversy/2013/12/14/7885a494-561a-11e3-ba82-16ed03681809_story.html?utm_term=.3943d8215f98.Google Scholar For a rare dissent from this conclusion, see Sunstein, “OIRA: Myths and Realities.”

132. Certainly OIRA has always been understaffed relative to its workload. While in the early 1980s, OIRA had more than 90 employees and hoped for 115, since the mid-1990s the office has been lucky to have as many as 50 staff members on hand. The Trump administration has proposed adding ten additional staff to OIRA. See C. Jarrett Dieterle, “Mulvaney Is Right to Call for More Money for OMB,” The Regulatory Review, 25 July 2017, available at https://www.theregreview.org/2017/07/25/dieterle-mick-mulvaney-money-omb/.

133. Weber, Max, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. Wright (New York, 1946), 128.Google Scholar