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Conceivability Arguments, Properties, and Powers: A New Defense of Dispositionalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 December 2018

ROBERT SCHROER
ROBERT SCHROER*
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA AT DULUTHrschroer@d.umn.edu
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Abstract

Dispositionalists maintain that the essence of a property is determined by the powers it confers upon its bearers and, as a result, that there is a necessary connection between properties and their powers. Contingentists, in contrast, maintain that the connection is contingent. The ability to conceive of a property as failing to confer some of its powers is often cited as an objection against dispositionalism. The standard dispositionalist response to this objection is to redescribe the imagined scenario so that it no longer serves as a threat. Using the literature on phenomenal concepts as inspiration, I develop a new defense of dispositionalism that echoes Brian Loar's (1990) response to conceivability arguments against physicalism. Not only can Loar's general strategy be usefully applied to this new context, there is a sense in which that strategy works better here than it does in the original context in which Loar deployed it.

Keywords

properties and powersdispositionalismconceivability argumentsthe phenomenal concept strategy
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , Fall 2018 , pp. 352 - 370
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2018 

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Footnotes

A number of people have helped me work through issues connected to this paper over the years; special thanks is owed to Alexis Elder and Brendan O'Sullivan for their recent comments. I also want thank several referees and an editor from the Journal of the American Philosophical Association for some tough questions and helpful suggestions.

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