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Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2016

WALTER OTT
WALTER OTT*
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIAwrottjr@gmail.com
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Abstract:

According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state's intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation—asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like—ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the core of the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue that, however counterintuitive it may seem, the best prospect for explaining how phenomenal character represents is an appeal to resemblance.

Keywords

intentional contentphenomenal intentionalityrepresentationresemblance
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , Spring 2016 , pp. 131 - 145
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2016 

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