Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-94fs2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T13:46:55.218Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Second-Personal Desire

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 March 2017

ADAM LEITE
ADAM LEITE*
Affiliation:
INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTONaleite@indiana.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

This paper concerns desires with a distinctive interpersonal structure. ‘Second-personal desire’ seeks something of or from a particular person who is the irreplaceable, intrinsic object of the desire by virtue of his or her significance to the desirer as a participant in an interpersonal relationship in which what is desired carries interpersonal significance. Such desires involve a wish that the other person will experience one's desire as a reason in a way that involves positive interpersonally directed emotional responsiveness to one's desire. Second-personal desire thus renders one vulnerable to distinctive forms of disappointment and to the possibility that the other person is neither positively motivated by, nor positively emotionally responsive to, the possibility of such disappointment. A distinctive form of positive emotional regard is thus always at issue in second-personal desire. This form of regard is not always owed, despite our craving for it—a fact that considerably complicates interpersonal interaction. The paper concludes with an argument that the participant reactive attitudes cannot be understood without the notion of second-personal desire and that second-personal desire is consequently crucial for an adequate understanding of the normative structure of interpersonal interaction.

Keywords

second personinterpersonal relationshipsreactive attitudesphilosophical psychologynondeontic normativitybipolar normativity
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 2 , Issue 4 , Winter 2016 , pp. 597 - 616
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2017 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Abramson, K., and Leite, A.. (2011) ‘Love as a Reactive Emotion’. Philosophical Quarterly, 61, 673–99.Google Scholar
Buss, S. (1999) ‘Appearing Respectful: The Moral Significance of Manners’. Ethics, 109, 795–826.Google Scholar
Darwall, S. (2006) The Second-Person Standpoint. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Darwall, S. (1977) ‘Two Kinds of Respect’. Ethics, 88, 36–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibbard, A. (1992) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Kant, I. (2000) The Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Gregor, Mary. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Mason, M. (2010) ‘On Shamelessness’. Philosophical Papers, 39, 401–25.Google Scholar
Scanlon, T. M. (2010) Moral Dimensions. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scanlon, T. M. (2013) ‘Interpreting Blame’. In Coates, Justin and Tognazzini, Neal (eds.), Blame (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 84–99.Google Scholar
Strawson, P. F. (1982) ‘Freedom and Resentment’. In Watson, Gary (ed.), Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 72–93.Google Scholar
Wallace, R. J. (1994) Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar