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An experimental study of leadership institutions in collective action games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Selhan Garip Sahin ,
Catherine Eckel  and
Mana Komai
Selhan Garip Sahin
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology, 1355 George Eastman Building (#1), 92 Lomb Memorial Drive, 14623 Rochester, NY, USA
Catherine Eckel*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, 3052 ALLN, 77843-4228 College Station, TX, USA
Mana Komai
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, St. Cloud State University, 381 SH, 720 4th Ave. South, 56301-4498 St. Cloud, MN, USA
*
e-mail: ceckel@tamu.edu
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Abstract

We investigate the effectiveness of two leadership institutions in each of two games: a weakest link and a linear public good game. An “Exemplar” leader is a first mover who commits to a level of contribution; a “Manager” is a first mover who makes cheap talk suggestions to the team members. Our results show that both leadership institutions reduce coordination failures as compared to a simultaneous move, baseline scenario with no leader. Although the Manager treatment seems to be slightly more effective at the outset, both leadership institutions significantly and equally improve contributions in the coordination game over time. According to our results none of the leadership institutions seem effective in the linear public good game. This may be due to the fact that our marginal per capita return is rather large, keeping the contribution levels high regardless of the treatment. Subjects who choose to free ride continue to do so with or without leaders, and subjects who choose to be cooperative do not become discouraged by others’ lack of cooperation. These results both replicate earlier findings and allow direct comparison across similar games.

Keywords

Leadership institutionsCoordination failureFree ridingWeakest link public good gameLinear public good game

JEL classification

C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior M12: Personnel Management • Executives; Executive Compensation
Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , July 2015 , pp. 100 - 113
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2015

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s40881-015-0010-6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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