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Communication in legislative bargaining

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Andrzej Baranski  and
John H. Kagel
Andrzej Baranski
Affiliation:
Ohio State University, Columbus, USA
John H. Kagel*
Affiliation:
Ohio State University, Columbus, USA
*
e-mail: kagel.4@osu.edu
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Abstract

We investigate the Baron-Ferejohn (The American Political Science Review 83(4): 1181–1206, 1989) model of legislative bargaining with cheap talk between the designated proposer and potential coalition partners. Communication results in substantially increased proposer power close to the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. This is achieved primarily through voters competing with each other to get the proposer to include them in the winning coalition, while arguing for a zero allocation for redundant voters. Voters typically follow through on their stated reservation shares, but proposers often fail to partner with voters making excessively low offers, as these are more likely to be reneged on.

Keywords

Legislative bargainingCheap talkBargaining styles

JEL classification

D7: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D8: Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , July 2015 , pp. 59 - 71
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2015

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s40881-015-0011-5) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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