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Framing effects in the prisoner’s dilemma but not in the dictator game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Sebastian J. Goerg Open the ORCID record for Sebastian J. Goerg [Opens in a new window] ,
David Rand  and
Gari Walkowitz
Sebastian J. Goerg*
Affiliation:
TUMCS for Biotechnology and Sustainability, Technical University Munich, 94315 Straubing, Germany TUM School of Management, Technical University Munich, 80333 Munich, Germany IZA-Institute of Labor Economics, 53113 Bonn, Germany MPI for Research on Collective Goods, 53113 Bonn, Germany
David Rand*
Affiliation:
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Gari Walkowitz*
Affiliation:
TUM School of Governance and Center Digitization Bavaria, Technical University of Munich, 80333 Munich, Germany National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
*
e-mail: s.goerg@tum.de
drand@mit.edu
gari.walkowitz@tum.de
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Abstract

We systematically investigate prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games with valence framing. We find that give versus take frames influence subjects’ behavior and beliefs in the prisoner’s dilemma games but not in the dictator games. We conclude that valence framing has a stronger impact on behavior in strategic interactions, i.e., in the prisoner’s dilemma game, than in allocation tasks without strategic interaction, i.e., in the dictator game.

Keywords

Prisoner’s dilemmaDictator gameFramingGiveTakeCooperationGenerosity

JEL classification

A13: Relation of Economics to Social Values F51: International Conflicts • Negotiations • Sanctions C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior Z13: Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology • Language • Social and Economic Stratification C72: Noncooperative Games
Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , June 2020 , pp. 1 - 12
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2019

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-019-00081-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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Appendix: Instructions for the experiment
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