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Investing in institutions for cooperation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Alexander Smith Open the ORCID record for Alexander Smith [Opens in a new window]  and
Xi Wen
Alexander Smith*
Affiliation:
Department of Social Science and Policy Studies (SSPS), Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), 100 Institute Road, Worcester, MA 01609, USA
Xi Wen
Affiliation:
Department of Social Science and Policy Studies (SSPS), Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), 100 Institute Road, Worcester, MA 01609, USA
*
e-mail: adksmith@wpi.edu
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Abstract

We examine the effects of endogenizing contribution productivity in a repeated public good game. In our experimental treatment, subjects collectively decide (by voting) how much to invest in augmenting the technology for producing the public good, and subsequently make individual voluntary contributions to provision. In the control, contribution productivity is exogenous. Contributions in the two treatments are similar.

Keywords

Public good gamesEndogenous institutionsProduction technologyContribution productivity

JEL classification

H41: Public Goods C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C71: Cooperative Games C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , July 2017 , pp. 75 - 87
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2017

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s40881-017-0033-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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