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Punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators: Do people discriminate between genders?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Valerio Capraro Open the ORCID record for Valerio Capraro [Opens in a new window]  and
Hélène Barcelo
Valerio Capraro*
Affiliation:
Economics Department, Middlesex University London, London, UK
Hélène Barcelo
Affiliation:
Mathematical Science Research Institute, Berkeley, CA, USA
*
e-mail: v.capraro@mdx.ac.uk
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Abstract

Do people discriminate between men and women when they have the option to punish defectors or reward cooperators? Here, we report on four pre-registered experiments that shed some light on this question. Study 1 (N = 544) shows that people do not discriminate between genders when they have the option to punish (reward) defectors (cooperators) in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma with third-party punishment/reward. Study 2 (N = 253) extends Study 1 to a different method of punishing/rewarding: participants are asked to rate the behaviour of a defector/cooperator on a scale of 1–5 stars. In this case too, we find that people do not discriminate between genders. Study 3a (N = 331) and Study 3b (N = 310) conceptually replicate Study 2 with a slightly different gender manipulation. These latter studies show that, in situations where they do not have specific beliefs about the gender of the defector/cooperator’s partner, neither men nor women discriminate between genders.

Keywords

PunishmentRewardCooperationGender

JEL classification

D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement H41: Public Goods D69: Other D02: Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact D79: Other
Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , September 2021 , pp. 19 - 32
Copyright
Copyright © 2021 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Hélène Barcelo supported by the US National Science Foundation under Grant No. DMS-1440140.

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