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Revisiting gender differences in ultimatum bargaining: experimental evidence from the US and China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Shuwen Li*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, USA
Xiangdong Qin
Affiliation:
Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
Daniel Houser
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA
*

Abstract

We report results from a replication of Solnick (Econ Inq 39(2):189, 2001), which finds using an ultimatum game that, in relation to males, more is demanded from female proposers and less is offered to female responders. We conduct Solnick’s (2001) game using participants from a large US university and a large Chinese university. We find little evidence of gender differences across proposer and responder decisions in both locations.

Type
Replication Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0054-5) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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