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A shared identity promotes herding in an information cascade game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Sebastian Berger Open the ORCID record for Sebastian Berger [Opens in a new window] ,
Christoph Feldhaus  and
Axel Ockenfels
Sebastian Berger*
Affiliation:
Department of Organization and Human Resource Management, University of Bern, Engehaldenstrasse 4, 3012 Bern, Switzerland
Christoph Feldhaus*
Affiliation:
Department of Business and Economics, University of Münster, Am Stadtgraben 9, 48143 Münster, Germany
Axel Ockenfels*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany
*
e-mail: sebastian.berger@iop.unibe.ch
christoph.feldhaus@wiwi.uni-muenster.de
ockenfels@uni-koeln.de
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Abstract

Our research addresses the effect of shared vs. mixed group identities in an information cascade game. We vary whether subjects always choose after a decision maker who shares the same identity or after a decision maker with a different identity. We find that subjects’ inclination to follow their predecessor is stronger in groups uniquely consisting of ingroup members compared to mixed groups. We relate this result to recent social cognition research.

Keywords

Information cascadesHerdingGroup identitySocial cognition

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior D70: General C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , July 2018 , pp. 63 - 72
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0050-9) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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