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Stated and revealed inequality aversion in three subject pools

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Benjamin Beranek ,
Robin Cubitt  and
Simon Gächter Open the ORCID record for Simon Gächter [Opens in a new window]
Benjamin Beranek
Affiliation:
Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham, Sir Clive Granger Building, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
Robin Cubitt
Affiliation:
Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham, Sir Clive Granger Building, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
Simon Gächter*
Affiliation:
Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham, Sir Clive Granger Building, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK CESifo, Munich, Germany IZA, Bonn, Germany
*
e-mail: simon.gaechter@nottingham.ac.uk
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Abstract

This paper reports data from three subject pools (n = 717 subjects) using techniques based on those of Loewenstein et al. (J Personal Soc Psychol 57:426–441, 1989) and Blanco et al. (Games Econ Behav 72:321–338, 2011) to obtain parameters, respectively, of stated and revealed inequality aversion. We provide a replication opportunity for those papers, with two innovations: (1) a design which allows stated and revealed preferences to be compared at the individual level; (2) assessment of robustness of findings across subjects from a UK university, a Turkish university and Amazon Mechanical Turk. Our findings on stated aversion to inequality are qualitatively similar to those of Loewenstein et al. in each of our subject pools, whereas there are notable differences between some of our findings on revealed preference and those of Blanco et al. We find that revealed advantageous inequality aversion is often stronger than revealed dis-advantageous inequality aversion. In most subject pools, we find some (weak) correlation between corresponding parameters of stated and revealed inequality aversion.

Keywords

Inequality aversionReplicationRevealed and stated preferencesRobustness across subject poolsMTurk

JEL classification

C90: General
Type
Replication Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , July 2015 , pp. 43 - 58
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2015

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s40881-015-0007-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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