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‘Letting the Phenomena In’: On How Herman's Kantianism Does and Does Not Answer the Empty Formalism Critique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 March 2011

Sally Sedgwick*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Chicago

Abstract

In Moral Literacy, Barbara Herman informs us that she will defend an ‘enlarged version of Kantian moral theory’ (Herman 2008: ix). Her ‘enlarged version’, she says, will provide a much-needed alternative to the common but misguided characterization of Kant's practical philosophy as an empty formalism. I begin with a brief sketch of the main features of Herman's corrective account. I endorse her claim that the enlarged Kantianism she defends is true to Kant's intentions as well as successful in correcting the objections she outlines. I then argue that there is another version of the empty formalism worry Herman does not address. Not only does she not address it, but her form of Kantianism provides fuel for its fire.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2011

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References

Herman, Barbara (2008) Moral Literacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Houlgate, StephenBaur, Michael (2011) A Companion to Hegel. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kant, Immanuel (1996a) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kant, Immanuel (1996b) Critique of Practical Reason (1788). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
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