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Sensibilism, Psychologism, and Kant's Debt to Hume
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2011
Abstract
Hume's account of causation is often regarded a challenge Kant must overcome if the Critical philosophy is to be successful. But from Kant's time to the present, Hume's denial of our ability to cognize supersensible objects, a denial that relies heavily on his account of causation, has also been regarded as a forerunner to Kant's critique of metaphysics. After identifying reasons for rejecting Wayne Waxman's recent account of Kant's debt to Hume, I present my own, more modest account of this debt, an account that seeks to unite the two very different pictures of Kant's relationship to Hume sketched above.
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