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The Contract in Surrogate Motherhood: A Review of the Issues

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 April 2021

Steven R. Gersz
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When Abraham's wife, Sarah, was unable to conceive a child for their marriage, she arranged for her handmaiden, Hagar, to bear a child for them. Abraham consummated this arrangement by making a visit to Hagar's tent.

Surrogate motherhood, as it is practiced today, differs only in insemination technique from this biblical effort. A married couple, unable to conceive because of female infertility, or, perhaps, a single male who desires a child would, as did Sarah, seek out a woman willing to act as a surrogate mother It is likely that the couple would make the initial contact through a classified advertisement and negotiate a contract with a fertile woman through their attorneys. The contract, in its most basic terms, would provide that the surrogate be artificially inseminated with the husband's semen, carry the child to term, and relinquish her parental rights upon birth of the child. Although there have been cases where a woman becomes a surrogate mother without payment, the surrogate mother typically receives a fee for her services as a carrier.

Type
Article
Information
Law, Medicine and Healthcare , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , June 1984 , pp. 107 - 114
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1984

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References

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This article does not discuss the issue of whether the surrogate motherhood procedure should only be available in cases of necessity. The use of a surrogate on behalf of a single male raises ethical and policy considerations not covered in this article. Generally, however, where a jurisdiction allows single parent adoptions, the parallel result effected through a surrogate should also be allowed. For simplicity, all future references to surrogate motherhood will be in the context of a married couple.Google Scholar
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(a) The placing of a child for adoption.Google Scholar
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