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Hospital-Sponsored Preferred Provider Organizations
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 April 2021
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The recent growth of new forms of health care delivery has been encouraged by the increase in competition in the health care industry. Several factors account for this increase in competition. First, there is an overabundance of physicians in many areas of the United States. In addition, many overbedded hospitals now compete for the same patients to fill their beds. Finally, health maintenance organizations and other alternative delivery systems, such as ambulatory surgical care centers, ‘surgicenters,” and birthing centers, are capturing more of the patient market and reducing hospital inpatient utilization.
Employers, insurers, and the government, as the third-party payers who most often pay for an individual's medical care, hope to take advantage of this new competitive environment and to moderate the increase in their health care expenditures.
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- © 1984 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics
References
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