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HART'S EXPRESSIVISM AND HIS BENTHAMITE PROJECT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 September 2005

Kevin Toh
Kevin Toh
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Indiana University
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In a 1973 article, H.L.A. Hart says the following about Jeremy Bentham's achievements in the philosophy of law: Bentham was certainly not the first to define law as a command: Hobbes, for example, had anticipated him in that, and even the despised Blackstone's definition of municipal law was in terms of command. But Bentham differed from Hobbes and, as far as I know, from all previous social theorists in insisting that we must not so define our terms in legal or political theory as to make the practical conclusions which we favour follow from them. Such definitions have been aptly called ‘persuasive definitions’ and among Bentham's many claims to be an innovator none is better founded nor, I think, more important than his insistence on a precise and so far as possible a morally neutral vocabulary for use in the discussion of law and politics. This insistence, though it may seem a merely linguistic matter, was the very centre, and I would say the sane and healthy centre, of the legal positivism of which Bentham may be regarded as the founder. It accounts for many important themes in his general theory including the form of his own definition of law. The terms that Bentham uses to define law are all flatly descriptive and normatively neutral. (1973, 28)

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ARTICLES
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Legal Theory , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , June 2005 , pp. 75 - 123
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© 2005 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

For very helpful written comments on and/or significant conversations about earlier drafts, I am grateful to Larry Alexander, Jules Coleman, John Devlin, Strefan Fauble, Allan Gibbard, Les Green, Michael Green, Don Herzog, Matt Kramer, Brian Leiter, Michael Moore, Gerhard Nuffer, Peter Railton, Connie Rosati, Larry Sager, Michael Sevel, Nishi Shah, Scott Shapiro, and especially Steve Darwall, David Hills, and David Velleman. The paper also benefited much from friendly and probing questions from audience members on two occasions: the first, at the Law and Philosophy Colloquium at the University of Texas Law School in Austin, October 2004; and the second, at the 10th Annual Analytic Legal Philosophy Conference, April 2005, again in Austin. I thank Brian Leiter and the steering committee of ALPC, respectively, for these invitations. Too many people helped on the second occasion for me to list all of their names, but I should single out Les Green, who provided very generous and helpful commentary at the session on my paper. I am afraid that I have been unable or, on some matters, too stubborn to benefit from many of the kind comments and advice.

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