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The Arab Spring and the Question of Legality of Democratic Revolution in Theory and Practice: A Perspective Based on the African Union Normative Framework

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2014

KALKIDAN OBSE
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Abstract

Traditional rules of international law do not recognize a positive right of revolution, nor a prohibition thereof as the relevant rules merely place the legality of revolutions in their effectiveness. However, the recent upsurge in democratically inspired revolutions has provided high currency to proposals that seek to re-evaluate the position of international law towards revolutions. Proponents of the theory of democratic revolution have sought to establish the legality of revolutions on an elevated normative ground using the lofty ideals of human rights and democratic governance and ultimately suggesting the existence of a positive right of democratic revolution under international law. Focusing on the Arab spring and the normative framework of the African Union, this article argues that the existing (emerging) human rights and democratic norms do not necessarily provide any distinct normative justifications for democratic revolutions beyond the legality that could be possibly established on the basis of traditional norms of international law. While the study recognizes emerging norms that represent a shift away from the effectiveness doctrine, it is observed that the pro-revolutionary implications of the norms are not as obvious as their importance as an (anti-revolutionary) injunction against the forcible ouster of democratically elected governments. The article concludes with the observation that the premium placed on democratic elections in the various normative instruments underscores the centrality of elections – and, alas, not revolutions – as the primary means through which the people's constitutive power (pouvoir constituant) is to be expressed.

Keywords

African UnionArab Springdemocratic governancedemocratic revolutionrevolutionary theory
Type
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 27 , Issue 4 , December 2014 , pp. 817 - 838
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2014 

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References

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9 AU PSC, Communiqué, PSC/PR/2 (CCLXXV), 26 April 2011.

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27 Ibid., at 7–8, 40.

28 Ibid., at 21.

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31 Ibid., at 295.

32 Therefore, we adopt a broader Kelsenian understanding of revolution which includes coups and other forms of revolution. As to the democratic component, we can retain parts of Varol's definition of democratic coup particularly the requirements that a democratic revolution targets an authoritarian or totalitarian regime and that it responds to popular opposition. See Kelsen, supra note 20, at 209. See also Varol, supra note 2, at 295.

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45 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982), Arts. 20 (2) and (3).

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56 Resolution 39/2, inter alia, reads: ‘. . . only the total eradication of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial democratic society based on majority rule, through the full and free exercise of adult suffrage by all the people in a united and unfragmented South Africa, can lead to a just and lasting solution of the explosive situation in South Africa’. Situation in South Africa, GA Res. 39/2, A/Res/39/2, 1984, at 6.

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58 For instance, Resolution 45/150 reads: ‘. . . the principle of periodic and genuine elections should not call into question each State's sovereign right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic, and cultural systems, whether or not they conform to the preferences of other States’. Enhancing the effectiveness the principle of periodic and genuine elections, GA Res 45/150, A/RES/45/150 (1990), at 4. Further, Resolution 45/151 reads: ‘. . . there is no single political system or single model for electoral processes equally suited to all nations and their peoples, and that political systems and electoral processes are subject to historical, political, cultural and religious factors.’ Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the international affairs of states in their electoral processes, GA Res 45/151, A/RES/45/151 (1990), preamble para. 8.

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62 See T. Meron, The Humanization of International Law (2006), 314.

63 See SC Res 1132, S/RES/1132 (1997), at 1. See also SC Res 1156, S/RES/1156 (1998), at para 1.

64 See SC Res 1975, S/RES/1975 (2011).

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71 For instance a draft resolution on Syria that would have required regime change was supported by the majority of members of the Security Council although the draft failed because of a double veto by Russia and China. See ‘Draft of Security Council Resolution on Syria, The New York Times (31 January 2012), available at <www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/world/middleeast/draft-of-security-council-resolution-on-syria.html?pagewanted=allamp;&_r&#x003D;0>;. See also J. Vidmar, ‘Human Rights, Democracy and the Legitimacy of Governments in International Law: Practice of States and UN Organs’, in Panara and Wilson (eds.), supra note 2, 70–1.

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73 Ibid., at 117.

74 Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 479 UNTS 39, entered into force 13 September 1963, Art. 2.

75 C. A. Odinkalu, ‘Concerning Kenya: The Current AU Position on Unconstitutional Changes in Government’, Open Society Justice Initiative (January 2008) available at <www.afrimap.org/english/images/paper/AU&UnconstitutionalChangesinGovt_Odinkalu_Jan08.pdf>.

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78 For a comprehensive assessment of the AU's policy of humanitarian intervention, see G. A. Aneme, A Study of the African Union's Right of Intervention against Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (2011).

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81 Although the Lomé Declaration is not a legally binding instrument, it nonetheless has legal significance owing to its incorporation under the 2003 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU's principal organ for peace and security matters including unconstitutional changes of government. For instance, Art. 7(g) of the Protocol empowers the PSC to institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place as provided for in the Lomé Declaration. See Vandeginste, S., ‘The African Union, Constitutionalism, and Power Sharing’, (2013) 57 Journal of African Law 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 4.

82 African Union (AU), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted by the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30 January 2007, entered into force 15 February 2012. Other regional instruments which, in one way or another, contribute to the normative content of the African Union's standards of democratic governance include: the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981/1986), the Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (2002), the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance (2002), and the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2003), and the AU Solemn Declaration on the African Common Defence and Security Policy (2004).

83 Constitutional Rights Project and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 191, 198, paras. 50–3 (ACHPR 1998). See also Sir Jawara, Dawda K. v. The Gambia (2000) AHRLR 107, 118 paras. 71–3 (ACHPR 2000)Google ScholarPubMed.

84 Lomé Declaration, paras. 12–15.

85 African Democracy Charter, Art. 25.

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91 Ibid.

92 See Abass, supra note 88, at 278.

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97 See section 5.2., infra.

98 For analysis of the positive impact of elections to democratization in the African context, see S. I. Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa (2006).

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101 See AU PSC, Communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM(CCLIX), 28 January 2011; AU PSC, Communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM.1(CCLXV), 10 March 2011; AU PSC, Communiqué PSC/PR/BR.1(CCLXX), 5 April 2011.

102 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, supra note 52, Art. 13.

103 See supra note 83.

104 See, e.g., Organization of African Unity (OAU), Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, AHG/Decl. 1 (XXXVIII), 8 July 2002, Arts. 2 and 3; see also African Democracy Charter Arts. 2(3), 3(4), and 17, and The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, AHG/235 (XXXVIII), 18 June 2002, para. 13.

105 Ibid.

106 African Democracy Charter, Arts. 17(4), 23(4) and 25.

107 African Democracy Charter, Art. 23(5). See also Abass, supra note 88, at 278. For a comprehensive assessment of the incorporation of presidential term limits in African constitutions and their significance to constitutionalism, see Fombad, C. M. and Inegbedion, N. A., ‘Presidential Term Limits and Their Impact on Constitutionalism in Africa’, in Fombad, C. M. and Murray, C. (eds.), Fostering Constitutionalism in Africa (2010), 1–183Google Scholar. Out of the 54 member states of the AU, 36 countries have so far incorporated presidential term limits in their constitutions: see I. Souaré, ‘Presidential Term Limits as a Policy Area to Bridge Between the African Union's Security and Governance Norms, abstract available at <www.nomadit.co.uk/ecas/ecas2013/panels.php5?PanelID=1803>. See also H. K. Prempeh, ‘Presidents Untamed’, in Diamond, L. J. and Plattner, M. F. (eds.), Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat (2010), 19Google Scholar.

108 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 45, Arts. 10, 11, and 13.

109 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), available at <idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/18432/6/IDL-18432.pdf>. The ICISS Report describes the legal status of the principle as an ‘emerging guiding principle’ of international law supported by ‘growing state and regional organization practice’. Core elements of the principle have been endorsed by the 2005 World Summit of the General Assembly and Security Council Resolution No. 1674. See ICISS Report (2001), at 2.24. See also The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document adopted by the General Assembly, G.A. Res. A/Res/60/1, 16 September 2005, paras. 138, 139; S.C. Res. 1674 (2006), S/Res/1674, 28 April 2006.

110 ICISS Report (2001), at 2.29.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid., at 2.25.

113 Ibid., at 4.19.

114 Ibid., at 6.1–6.40.

115 United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1973, The Situation in Libya, S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011.

116 See Wilson, supra note 69. See also Pippan, C., ‘The 2011 Libyan Uprising, Foreign Military Intervention, and International Law’, (2011) 2 Juridikum Zeitschrift für Kritik, at 164–8Google Scholar.

117 See O. Tungwarara, ‘The Arab Spring and the AU Response’, Open Society Institute, Africa Governance Monitoring & Advocacy Project (AfriMAP, 19 September 2011), available at <http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/paper/AfriMAP_NAfrica_Tungwarara_EN.pdf>.

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119 AU PSC, Communiqué, PSCPR/COMM.(CCLXI), 23 February 2011.

120 See Sobers, O. H., ‘The Inter-American System of Human Rights’ in Zyberi, G. (ed.), An Institutional Approach to the Responsibility to Protect (2013), 461–2Google Scholar.

121 ICISS Report (2001), at 4.33.

122 Hoffmann, J. and Nollkaemper, A., ‘Concluding Observations’, in Hoffmann, J. and Nollkaemper, A. (eds.), Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice (2012), 368–9Google Scholar.