Brazil's Gini coefficient rose from 0.57 in 1981 to 0.63 in 1989, before falling back to 0.56 in 2004. Poverty incidence rose from 0.30 in 1981 to 0.33 in 1993, before falling to 0.22 in 2004. This paper presents a preliminary investigation of the determinants of Brazil's distributional reversal over this period. The rise in inequality in the 1980s appears to have been driven by increases in educational attainment in a context of convex returns, and by high and accelerating inflation. Although the secular decline in inequality, which began in 1993, is associated with declining inflation, it also appears to have been driven by four structural and policy changes, namely, declining returns to education; pronounced rural-urban convergence; increases in social assistance transfers targeted to the poor; and a possible decline in racial inequality. Falling inequality has made a substantial contribution to poverty reduction.

This paper evaluates two well-known models of growth with inequality that have explicit micro underpinnings related to household choice. With incomplete markets or transactions costs, wealth can constrain investment in business and the choice of occupation and also constrain the timing of entry into the formal financial sector. Using the Thai Socio-Economic Survey (SES), we estimate the distribution of wealth and the key parameters that best fit cross-sectional data on household choices and wealth. We then simulate the model economies for two decades at the estimated initial wealth distribution and analyze whether the model economies at those micro-fit parameter estimates can explain the observed macro and sectoral aspects of income growth and inequality change. Both models capture important features of Thai reality. Anomalies and comparisons across the two distinct models yield specific suggestions for improved research on the micro foundations of growth and inequality.

We consider an agent-based model of financial markets with asynchronous order arrival in continuous time. Buying and selling orders arrive in accordance with a Poisson dynamics where the order rates depend both on past prices and on the mood of the market. The agents form their demand for an asset on the basis of their forecasts of future prices and their forecasting rules may change over time as a result of the influence of other traders. Among the possible rules are “chartist” or extrapolatory rules. We prove that when chartists are in the market, and with choice of scaling, the dynamics of asset prices can be approximated by an ordinary delay differential equation. The fluctuations around the first-order approximation follow an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck dynamics with delay in a random environment of investor sentiment.

We propose a model to study monetary policy under discretion. We focus on Markov perfect equilibria, ruling out trigger strategies. The model is simple enough that the determinants of monetary policy under discretion are clear. We also find that for all parameterizations with an equilibrium inflation rate around 2%, there is a second equilibrium with an inflation rate just above 10%. Thus the model can simultaneously account for the low- and high-inflation episodes in the U.S. experience.

This paper proposes a sunspot-based mechanism that quantitatively accounts for the main monetary facts. In particular, we propose a cash-in-advance model with habit persistence and local durability in consumption decisions. In this context, when habit persistence is strong enough, there is real indeterminacy. We show that when sunspots positively correlate with money injections, the model generates a persistent response of inflation, a hump-shaped response of output, and the price puzzle. We then apply the model to the U.S data and we show that it performs well in reproducing the monetary transmission mechanism and the price puzzle in the short run.

The fiscal theory of the price level says that the price level can be made determinate if the government uses fiscal policies such that government liabilities explode unless the price in the first period is at the “right” level. The policy implications are disturbing, as they call for rather adventurous fiscal policies. We show that these disturbing policy implications are specific to the “Ricardian” models that have been used to develop the theory. By moving to non-Ricardian models, we see that price determinacy is consistent with reasonable fiscal policies.

In this paper, we study a decentralized monetary economy with a specified set of markets, rules of trade, an equilibrium concept, and a restricted set of policies and derive a set of equilibrium (monetary) allocations generated by these policies. Next we set up a simpler constrained planning problem in which we restrict the planner to choose from a set that contains the set of equilibrium allocations in the decentralized economy. If there is a government policy that allows the decentralized economy to achieve the constrained planner's allocation, then it is the optimal policy choice. To illustrate the power of such analyses, we solve such planning problems in three monetary environments with limited communication. The upshot is that solving constrained planning problems is potentially an extremely “efficient” (easy and quick) way of deriving optimal policies for the corresponding decentralized economies.

This paper examines asset-price bubbles in an economy where a nondepletable asset (e.g., land) can provide transaction services, using a variant of the cash-in-advance model. When a landowner can borrow money immediately using land as collateral, one can say that land essentially provides a transaction service. The transaction services that such an asset can provide increase as its price rises, as the asset owner can borrow more money against the asset's increased value. Thus, an asset-price bubble can emerge due to the externality of self-reference, wherein the asset price reflects the transaction services that it can provide, whereas the amount of the transaction services reflects the asset price. If the collateral ratio of the asset (θ) and money supply (m) are not very large, a steady-state equilibrium exists where the asset price has a bubble component and resource allocation is inefficient; if θ and/or m become large, the bubble component of the asset price vanishes and the equilibrium allocation becomes efficient. The paper shows that in the case where the equilibrium concept is relaxed to allow for sticky prices and a temporary supply-demand gap, an equilibrium exists where a bubble develops temporarily and eventually bursts.

We consider endogenous changes of inputs from labor to capital in the production of intermediate goods, i.e., a form of mechanization. We derive complementary relationships between capital accumulation and mechanization by assuming a Cobb–Douglas production function for the production of final goods from intermediate goods. A constant-elasticity-of-substitution production function in which the elasticity of substitution exceeds unity can be endogenously derived as the envelope of Cobb–Douglas production functions when the efficiency of inputs is assumed in a specific form. The difficulty of mechanization represents the elasticity of substitution.

This paper presents a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with imperfect competition and nominal price rigidities in which productivity shocks coexist with markup shocks. After analyzing the features of the optimal cooperative solution, we show that this allocation can be implemented in a strategic context through inflation-targeting regimes. Under these regimes, each monetary authority minimizes a quadratic loss function that targets only domestic targets, namely, GDP inflation and the output gap.

In the United States wealth is highly concentrated and very unequally distributed: the richest 1% hold one third of the total wealth in the economy. Understanding the determinants of wealth inequality is a challenge for many economic models. We summarize some key facts about the wealth distribution and what economic models have been able to explain so far.

This paper analyzes exchange-rate dynamics following a money-based disinflation under different degrees of exchange-rate pass-through. Using a microfounded dynamic general equilibrium model with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities, it is shown that a monetary slowdown causes an appreciation of the exchange rate and a short-run fall in employment. Varying the degree of pass-through, however, significantly alters the magnitudes of these effects. As the degree of pass-through is reduced, the extent of the short-run appreciation of the exchange rate increases and the short-run impact of the disinflation on employment falls.

Two phenomena are widely observed when an economy departs from an underdeveloped state and starts rapid economic growth. One is the shift of production, employment, and consumption from the traditional sector to the modern sector, and the other is a large increase in educational levels of the population. The question is why some economies have succeeded in such structural change, but others do not. To examine the question, an overlapping generations (OLG) model that explicitly takes into account the sectoral shift and human capital accumulation as sources of development is constructed. It is shown that, for a successful structural change, an economy must start with a wealth distribution that gives rise to an adequate size of the “middle class.” Once the economy initiates the “take-off,” the sectoral shift and human capital growth continue until it reaches the steady state with high income and equal distribution. However, when the productivity of the traditional sector is low, irrespective of the initial distribution and the productivity of the modern sector, it fails in the sectoral shift and ends up in one of steady states with low income and high inequality. Thus, sufficient productivity of the traditional sector is a prerequisite for development.

This note provides a formal justification for the Friedman and Savage nonconcavity in the utility of money. This is based on the possibility of indivisibilities in the consumption possibilities set. A precise characterization of when gambling is optimal (and the optimal type) is provided in one special case. Some possible limitations are considered.

This paper studies the evolution of European fiscal policies in three periods: the pre-Maastricht phase (to 1991); the runup to monetary union (1992–1997), and the stability pact phase (1998 onward). Using three separate indicators, we search for structural breaks that could signify a change in the average level of discipline in these periods. We find increased fiscal discipline only up to 1997. We conclude the new fiscal discipline was a temporary phenomenon, a product of the sanction of being denied entry to the Euro. After EMU, fiscal policy gradually loosened. A single structural break test will miss these dynamic effects, and could easily generate the false conclusion that fiscal discipline had tightened since the start of phase two of EMU.

We study identification in a class of linear rational expectations models. For any given exactly identified model, we provide an algorithm that generates a class of equivalent models that have the same reduced form. We use our algorithm to show that a model proposed by Jess Benhabib and Roger Farmer is observationally equivalent to the standard new-Keynesian model when observed over a single policy regime. However, the two models have different implications for the design of an optimal policy rule.

This paper introduces adaptive learning into the third-generation currency crisis model of Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001, Currency crises and monetary policy in an economy with credit constraints, European Economic Review 45, 1121–1150). Adaptive learning might reflect, for example, uncertainty about the economy's exposure to adverse balance sheet effects. Even when equilibrium is unique, we show that the learning algorithm's escape dynamics can produce the same kind of Markov-switching exchange rate behavior that is typically attributed to sunspots or herds. An advantage of our learning model is that currency crises become endogenous, in the sense that their stochastic properties can be related to assumptions about learning and other structural features of the economy.

In past years, imperfect competition has been introduced in several dynamic models to show how markup variability, increasing returns (decreasing marginal cost), and monopoly profits affect the occurrence of endogenous fluctuations. In this paper, we focus on another possible feature of imperfectly competitive economies: consumers' taste for variety as a result of endogenous product diversity. Introducing monopolistic competition [Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Benassy (1996)] in an overlapping generations model in which consumers have taste for variety, we show that local indeterminacy can occur under the three following conditions: a high substitution between capital and labor, increasing returns arbitrarily small, and a not too elastic labor supply. The key mechanism for this result is based on the fact that, because of taste for variety, the aggregate price decreases with the procyclical product diversity, which has a direct influence on the real wage and the real interest rate.

This paper replaces increasing product variety with quality upgrading in the Romer model [Romer, Paul M., Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990), S71–S102]. We show that the range of parameters for which a steady state exists can be divided into two subspaces with well-behaved comparative statics and saddle-point dynamics in one subspace, but with “perverse” comparative-statics properties and either equilibrium indeterminacy or instability in the other subspace. These results for the closed economy can also be used to characterize the dynamics of the M-country open-economy version of the model.