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Organizational Imprinting and Response to Institutional Complexity: Evidence from Publicly-Traded Chinese State-Owned Firms in Hong Kong

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2017

Yifan Wei*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

Abstract

This study seeks to answer the following question: What are the organizational attributes that influence organizational responses to institutional complexity? Building on core ideas of organizational imprinting, I argue that organizational response is influenced by the imprint from the dominant logic of organizing during the founding period and from the institutional position an organization possessed at founding. Empirically, I examine the variation in board composition of Chinese state-owned firms listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange market. It is found that state-owned firms founded in the market logic dominant period tend to have more non-state directors on the board in that they were organized around the prescription of the market logic and more responsive to shareholders’ demands for legitimacy reasons. Besides, state-owned firms founded by central government agencies tend to have fewer non-state directors because they were born at the center of the socialist system to accomplish strategic goals of the central government and non-state directors may challenge the vested interests. This study contributes to the organizational imprinting and institutional literature and resonates with the contemporary call for a more systematic examination of organizational attributes that influence organizational responses to institutional complexity.

摘要:

摘要:

本研究试图回答以下这个问题:是什么组织属性影响对制度复杂性的组织反应༟在组织印记核心观点的基础上, 我认为, 组织反应受创建时期所主导的组织逻辑及创建时组织所拥有制度位置的印记的影响。实证上, 我考察在香港股票交易所上市的中国国有企业董事会组成的变化。研究发现, 在市场逻辑主导时期创建的国有企业的董事会里往往有更多的非国有董事, 它们是围绕市场逻辑的处方组织起来的, 同时对股东对合法性理由的需求有更多响应。此外, 由中央政府部门成立的国有企业往往拥有较少的非国有董事, 因为它们定位在社会主义制度的中心去完成中央政府的战略目标, 而非国有董事可能会挑战既得利益。这项研究对组织印记和制度文献做出了贡献, 与当代更系统地去研究影响对制度复杂性的组织反应的组织属性的呼吁共鸣。

यह शोध पत्र निम्न प्रश्न का उत्तर देने की चेष्टा करता है: कौन से संगठनात्मक गन संस्थागत जटिलता पर संगठनात्मक प्रतिक्रियाओं को प्रभावित करते हैं? संगठनात्मक अंकन के आधारभूत विचार को लेते हुए मेरा यह मत है की संगठनात्मक प्रतिक्रियाएं संस्थापना काल के गठन-परिप्रेक्ष्य के अंकन से और तत्कालीन संस्थागत परिस्थिति से प्रभावित होते हैं. मैंने होन्ग कोंग स्टॉक एक्सचेंज में सूचीबद्ध राज्य स्वामित्व वाली चीनी फर्मों के बोर्ड की संरचना का अनुभवजन्य आकलन किया है. शोध में यह पाया गया की बाज़ारपरक परिप्रेक्ष्य काल में संस्थापित राजकीय फर्मों में गैर-राजकीय निदेशकों की बहुलता है क्योंकि ये बाज़ारपरक निर्देशों पर आधारित हैं और वैधता के लिए शेयरधारकों की मांगों को ओर अधिक सजग हैं. साथ ही केहदृया सर्कार संस्थानों द्वारा संस्थापित राजकीय फर्मों में काम गैर-राजकीय निदेशक होते हैं क्योंकि वे समाजवादी संरचना के केंद्रबिंदु में हैं और सर्कार की रणनीतियों को पूरा करने के लिए हैं. इस कार्य मैं गैर सरकारी पात्र निहितार्थ को चुनौती दे सकते हैं. यह शोध संगठनात्मक अंकन और संस्थापरक शोध साहित्य में योगदान करता है और सम्प्रति संस्थागत जटिलता को प्रभाविक करने वाले संगठनात्मक गुणों का आकलन करने के आह्वान से गुंजायमान है.

Abstract:

ABSTRACT:

Este estudo procura responder a seguinte pergunta: Quais são os atributos organizacionais que influenciam as respostas organizacionais à complexidade institucional? Baseando-me em ideias centrais de marca organizacional, argumento que as respostas organizacionais são influenciadas pela marca da lógica dominante de organização durante o período de fundação e da posição institucional que uma organização possui na fundação. Empiricamente, examino a variação na composição do conselho de empresas estatais chinesas listadas na bolsa de valores de Hong Kong. Verifica-se que as empresas estatais fundadas no período dominante da lógica de mercado tendem a ter mais conselheiros não ligados ao governo os quais foram organizados em torno da prescrição da lógica de mercado e mais responsivos às demandas dos acionistas por motivo de legitimidade. Além disso, as empresas estatais fundadas pelas agências do governo central tendem a ter menos diretores não ligados ao governo porque eles foram posicionadas no centro do sistema socialista para cumprir os objetivos estratégicos do governo central, e diretores não ligados ao governo podem desafiar tais interesses. Este estudo contribui para a marca organizacional e literatura institucional e ressoa com o chamado contemporâneo para um exame mais sistemático sobre os atributos organizacionais que influenciam as respostas organizacionais à complexidade institucional.

Аннотация:

АННОТАЦИЯ:

Данное исследование ставит своей задачей дать ответ на следующий вопрос: каковы организационные особенности, которые предопределяют организационную реакцию на институциональную сложность? На основании главных идей организационного импринтинга, я утверждаю, что организационные реакции находятся под влиянием доминирующей логики организации в период основания, а также институционального положения, которое организация занимает при создании. Я эмпирически изучаю состав правления китайских государственных компаний, зарегистрированных на Гонконгской фондовой бирже. В результате, исследование показало, что государственные фирмы, которые были основаны в период доминирования рыночной логики, имеют тенденцию к тому, что в совете директоров будет больше негосударственных директоров, поскольку такие компании были организованы на основании рыночной логики и более восприимчивы к требованиям акционеров о легитимности. Кроме того, государственные фирмы, которые были созданы центральными правительственными агентствами, как правило, имеют меньше негосударственных директоров, поскольку они позиционируются в центре социалистической системы для достижения стратегических целей правительства, тогда как негосударственные директора могут бросить вызов кулуарным интересам. Это исследование вносит свой вклад в научную литературу по организационному импринтингу и институциональному подходу, а также отвечает на призыв к более систематическому изучению организационных атрибутов, которые предопределяют организационную реакцию на институциональную сложность.

Resumen:

RESUMEN:

Este estudio busca responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿Cuáles son los atributos organizacionales que influencian las respuestas organizacionales a la complejidad institucional? Partiendo de las ideas centrales sobre la impronta organizacional, sostengo que las respuestas organizacionales son influenciadas por la impronta de la lógica dominante de la organización durante el período de su fundación y desde la posición institucional que una organización posee en su fundación. Empíricamente, examino la variación en la composición de la junta directiva de las empresas estatales chinas que cotizan en el mercado bursátil de Hong Kong. Fue encontrado que las empresas estatales fundadas en el período dominante de lógica de mercado tienden a tener más directores no estatales en la junta dado que fueron organizadas alrededor de la prescripción de la lógica de mercado y son más receptivas a los requerimientos de los accionistas por razones de legitimidad. Adicionalmente, las empresas estatales fundadas por las agencias del gobierno central tienden a tener menos directores no estatales puesto que estas fueron posicionadas en el centro del sistema socialista para lograr los objetivos estratégicos del gobierno central y los directores no estatales pudieran desafiar los intereses creados. Este estudio contribuye a la literatura sobre la impronta organizacional e institucional y hace eco al llamado por un examen más sistemático sobre los atributos organizacionales que influencian las respuestas organizacionales a la complejidad institucional.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The International Association for Chinese Management Research 2017 

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