The first three paragraphs of article 13 of the Benelux Uniform Law on Conflicts of Law, as revised in 1969, read as follows.

1. In respect both of compulsory and not compulsory legal provisions, contracts shall be governed by the law as chosen by the parties.

2. As far as the contract is clearly localized in a given country, the choice of the parties cannot overrule such legal provisions of the said country as, in virtue of their particular character and purport, exclude the application of any different law.

3. Failing a choice by the parties, either explicit, or implicit but certain, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it shows the narrowest points of contact.

The criticism to these paragraphs as offered in the foregoing paper, does not bear on the principles, as set out above, but on the wording thereof.

After a conceptual examination of global values and their role in international law, this article examines the role of the United Nations, especially the General Assembly, in the translation of globally shared values into legally binding international commitments. This process already commenced with the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held in 1945 in San Francisco, where the UN Charter was born. The way this process functions is illustrated by using the global value of social progress and development as an example. First, it is shown how this value ended up in the UN Charter in 1945. This is followed by a description of this value's evolution, especially the inclusion of a ‘sustainability element’, which took place at the General Assembly and various global conferences organized under the auspices of the United Nations.

The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive provides tools to deal effectively with unsound or failing banks. Some provisions of this directive are designated as overriding mandatory provisions as referred to in Article 9 Rome I Regulation. The author analyses the effectiveness of the designation of a rule as an overriding mandatory provision, given the principle of private international law that parties can choose the applicable law and the competent forum. His conclusion is that in an international context overriding mandatory provisions are not always as overriding or as mandatory as they may seem at first sight. This may be acceptable with regard to 'normal' overriding mandatory provisions. However, the author argues that financial stability is so important that overriding mandatory provisions that protect financial stability need special treatment.

This article is premised on my belief that the use of force and violence should not be unlimited, even in times of war. Despite countless examples of apparently lawless wartime behavior, the fact that international wars are subject to limits is fairly well-accepted. The Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials evidence the consequences of having exceeded acceptable limits of violence and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 represent an extensive codification of those limits for international war. Most States are parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and many of the provisions of those treaties are recognized as customary international law.

The Conference which met at Lancaster House, London, from March 31 to April 6, 1966, from October 17 to 28, 1966, and from March 6 to 17, 1967, and which resulted in the establishment of a new “Convention on Conduct of Fishing Operations in the North Atlantic” was made necessary by the denunciation by the British Government in 1963 of the Hague “International Convention for regulating the Police of the North Sea Fisheries” which, since 1882, had governed the conduct of fishing operations and their policing between the coastal states of the North Sea. Formally the convening of this Conference was based on a resolution, adopted by the 1963/64 European Fisheries Conference on January 17, 1964, asking the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

“To invite the Governments of all countries participating in the North-East Atlantic fisheries to send representatives to a technical conference to be held as soon as possible to prepare for the consideration of the governments concerned a draft Convention, on the general lines of the 1882 Convention for regulating the police of the North Sea Fisheries, embodying a modern code for the conduct of fishing operations and of related activities in the North-East Atlantic;

And to invite the Governments of the United States of America and Canada to send representatives to the Conference so that the extension of the provisions of any such Convention to the North-West Atlantic Fisheries may be considered.”

In 1967, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the Confederation, the author of this paper suggested that it was about time for Canada to join the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Such a move would show to everyone that Canada's legal horizons and objectives had become world wide. The government of the day followed this suggestion and, in 1968, Canada joined the Conference. Since that time, Canada has participated actively in its work as well as that of other international organizations devoted to the unification of law especially in the area of commercial law. It is, therefore, appropriate to examine recent trends in the field of private international law in Canada on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the Hague Conference and to ascertain the extent to which Canadian rules have been influenced by its conventions.

This paper focuses upon a comparatively overlooked issue with regard to the scope of self-defence in international law: whether the subjective ‘psychological’ positions of the states concerned in a dispute involving the use force have any impact upon the lawfulness of an action avowedly taken in self-defence. There exists a long standing conception that the motives of a state responding in self-defence are relevant to the lawfulness of that response. The purity (or impurity) of a state's motive forms the basis of a distinction for many writers between a lawful self-defence action and an unlawful armed reprisal. Similarly, in recent decisions of the ICJ, the implication has been that the subjective intention of the attacking state may be relevant to the question of whether the attack perpetrated by that state can trigger the right of self-defence. The conclusion is reached here that the lawfulness of an avowed self-defence action should be premised upon objective criteria alone. Moreover, this reflects the law as it is in fact applied in practice. It is argued that the subjective ‘psychological’ position of either the responding or attacking state has no place in the final analysis of whether an action in self-defence was lawful or unlawful.

The recent Tenerife aircrash of March 1977 involves a variety of multistate issues. The Dutch lawyer, if unable to obtain a satisfactory settlement for his client, may contemplate undertaking action in the U.S.A. He will then be confronted with such questions as against whom he can bring proceedings, under the jurisdiction of which court, what the procedure will be, and which state or national law will apply. He will also be required to know who may bring an action, who may ultimately benefit from it and what items may be included to determine the amount of damages.

On 21 May, Professor Dr. Jan Hendrik Willem Verzijl died peacefully at his home in the ninety-ninth year of his life. In his person, one of the last witnesses of a tremendously important period in international law has passed away — a period commencing, as far as he was concerned, with the Second Hague Conference of 1907.