The humble contribution of this writer to the Festschrift in honour of Professor A.J.P. Tammes relates to a study of the status and norms of the principle of self-determination in contemporary international law. There has been a prolonged controversy on the issue: some consider that the principle now enjoys the status of a legal right with corresponding obligations while others attribute only a moral status to the principle without any binding legal effect. By way of illustration of the nature of the controversy one can refer to the views of Rosalyn Higgins on the one hand and of Leo Gross, L.C. Green and Rupert Emerson on the other. According to Rosalyn Higgins, the main question is not whether the General Assembly resolutions have any binding effect but whether the practice of States (which she finds unanimous and consistent) revealed by the cumulative effect of such resolutions indicates the emergence of new norms or rules of customary international law. Dr. Higgins considers that the conclusion is inescapable that self-determination has developed into an international legal right. To Professor Leo Gross, the practice of decolonization (which he finds neither constant nor uniform) is a matter of political expediency, not based on a sense of legal obligation. Hence, subsequent practice as an element of interpretation does not support the theory that the principle of self-determination has acquired the status of a legal right or that human rights provisions could be interpreted as rights with corresponding obligations either generally or specifically with respect to the right to self-determination. Rupert Emerson considers it a relevant factor that the colonial Powers and a number of States supporting them have not accepted the basic principle that colonization is illegitimate nor the corollary proposition that the colonial peoples are entitled to as speedy as possible an exercise of their right to self-determination. After pointing out that there is still no right of self-determination in positive international law, Professor Green has conceded that since 1966 (when by Resolution 2200 (xxi) of 16 December 1966 both the Covenants on Human Rights were adopted by the General Assembly), such a right may be one in nascendi and may mature into a legal right in future as and when such non-binding instruments come into force; such a right can never operate retroactively, particularly because no attempt has been made to clarify what is meant by the “peoples” who are supposed to enjoy the right.

Party autonomy provides certainty and predictability to the parties, reduces litigation costs, promotes the prompt assertion of jurisdiction by a court, and simplifies case management between different countries. However, the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause cannot completely extinguish conflicts of jurisdiction. Common law countries traditionally adopt discretionary instruments, such as forum non conveniens and anti-suit injunctions to tackle conflicts of jurisdiction. Both instruments work together in common law countries to create a balance between international comity and effective case management. The application of these two instruments, however, has been questioned in the European Union (EU). This article examines conflicts of jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation and particularly focuses on the effect of the European approach in cases involving a jurisdiction clause. It is submitted that the current Brussels regime in dealing with conflicts of jurisdiction and choice of court agreements demonstrates three weaknesses: procedural certainty takes priority over party autonomy; mutual trust and comity override justice in individual cases; and an artificial fragmentation of the internal and international market. It is expected that situations will be improved after the proposed amendment in the Recast Proposal and the Presidency Amendment is adopted, which provides harmonised choice of law rules to decide on the material validity of a jurisdiction clause and the negative kompetenz-kompetenz rule to decide on the preliminary issue of an exclusive choice of court agreement. Although the proposals do not accept the common law instruments to tackle conflicts of jurisdiction in cases with exclusive jurisdiction clauses, it may not be necessary to insist that forum non conveniens and anti-suit injunctions be adopted where a proper approach has been established to ensure the effectiveness of an exclusive jurisdiction clause and to provide for the priority of the courts in deciding on its validity. However, the European lawmaker should pay specific attention to the improvement of the functioning of the Regulation in the international context to tackle conflicts of jurisdiction in choice of court agreements involving a third country.

The present article is intended to give a résumé of the international law questions arising in connection with Article 25 of the Constitution of the German Federal Republic of 23 May 1949, which reads as follows: “The general rules of public international law are an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and shall directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory”. First of all it must be recalled that the Weimar Constitution of 11 August 1919 included a similar provision. Article 4 provided: “The generally recognised rules of international law constitute a binding integral part of the legal system of the German Empire.”

Current trends in social relationships, strongly influenced by their increasingly international character, are resulting in a steadily growing interdependence of sovereign States. Political, economic, military and social problems have been re-examined. Organisations, economic unions, military alliances and defence agreements have been established. Free movement of persons and goods is everywhere considered to be desirable, while in the meantime the formalities to be completed on crossing frontiers have been reduced to a bare minimum. The development of tourism, which now plays an important role for three or four months in the year and which attracts all sections of the population, is equally a demonstration of a real desire for foreign contacts.

L'affaire de la Société néerlandaise pour l'exploitation de réclame (Reklame Exploitatie Maatschappij R.E.M.) laquelle, en érigeant une installation fixe en haute mer devant la côte néerlandaise à la limite de la mer territoriale, envisageait de réaliser des émissions de télévision destinées à être reçues sur le territoire néerlandais, a suscité l'intérêt dans les milieux néerlandais les plus divers. C'est notamment à l'intention de nos lecteurs à l'étranger que nous nous proposons de relater dans le présent article les faits tels qu'ils se sont produits. Nous allons faire suivre cet exposé d'un commentaire qui exposera quelques aspects du droit international relatifs à cette affaire. Nous avons fondé nos observations en grande partie sur le rapport de la Commission consultative néerlandaise en matière de droit international, rapport qui a reçu l'approbation unanime de ses membres et dont quelques extraits seront reproduits textuellement dans l'exposé qui va suivre. Le texte intégral de ce rapport est publié ci-après dans la section « Documents ».

Radioactive waste is not at present, at least officially, dumped at sea or disposed of into the seabed. At the regional level, several treaties prohibit such disposal. At the global level, the dumping at sea of high-level radioactive waste and the disposal of all radioactive waste in Antarctica, including the ocean areas south of 60 degrees south latitude, are prohibited by international law. The dumping at sea of low-level radioactive waste and the sub-seabed disposal of all radioactive waste (hereinafter also referred to as the ocean disposal options), at the global level, are subject to legally non-binding and temporary suspensions or moratoria. It is thus that the ocean disposal options remain on the international agenda and that the permissibility of using these options remains an issue of debate.

John Locke's Two Treatises of Government, published in 1690, exerted a profound influence upon such great instruments on human rights as: The American Declaration of Independence of 4 July 1776; The French Declaration on the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 26 August 1789; The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948; and The International Covenants on Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966. The reflection of many ideas contained in the Two Treatises of Government in these Instruments on human rights is so obvious that it would be no exaggeration to say that Locke is their spiritual father, although so far this credit is not yet given to him explicitly.

Bij de legenwoordige zware belastingdruk oefent de vrijstelling van belasting over genoten inkomen, aan bepaalde functies op internationaal terrein verbunden, een magische werking uit op hen, die niet op dit voorrecht kunnen aanspraak maken. Met ontstemming nemen zij, die een groot deel van hun zuur verdiende penningen in de grijpgrage handen van de fiscus zien verdwijnen, kennis van het feit, dat de naar hun oordeel toch reeds buitensporig hoge salarissen, op dit gebied betaald, bovendien nog vrij van belasting zijn. Het kornt ons wel nuttig voor in deze tijd, nu het scheppen van nieuwe internationale organen aan de orde van de dag is, aan deze vrijstellingen enkele beschouwingen te wijden.

The Conference, held in Vienna at the invitation of the Austrian Government from 18 February to 21 March 1986, was to consider the draft articles on the law of treaties between States and international organizations or between international organizations, initially prepared by the International Law Commission and finalized by them in 1982. The ILC unanimously adopted the text of these articles, with the exception of Article 66 (settlement of disputes).

On 4th October, 1957, a man-made machine forche first time overrode the age old law proclaiming that everything that goes up must come down. Fifteen months later a means was developed of circumventing the earth's attraction. In September, 1959, the moon was reached and on 12th April, 1961, Major Gagarin orbited the Earth in a space capsule. In the short period of four years man's advance in space has been more rapid than the most sanguine forecaster has dared to predict, and it is now realized that a new phase in the history of mankind of exploration and development has begun in some ways comparable to, but vastly exceeding these in scope, the conquest of the sea and the air. Nobody can visualize the impact the conquest of space is going to have on life on this planet, but it becomes clearer every day that a process of change has started more profound and more sweeping than any which has overtaken the world since the foundation of the modern world.

There are refugees and stateless persons. Some stateless persons are refugees and some refugees are stateless. They all lack proper protection. Often, stateless persons can be considered as refugees, as they might have “a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and are unwilling or unable to avail themselves of the protection of … the country of habitual residence”. Refugees who are not stateless are those who for the above mentioned reasons are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of the country of their nationality. A difference is sometimes made between de jure and de facto stateless persons. It is better to speak about de jure and de facto unprotected persons. Generally, refugees are de facto unprotected and stateless persons are de jure unprotected. It would moreover seem more appropriate to concentrate on the protection aspect, as nationality can be related to various forms of protection. In this respect the difference between “unable” and “unwilling” should be stressed: stateless persons are normally unable to invoke any protection, while asylum-seekers with a nationality are normally unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality. It is taken for granted that the relationship between a country and its citizens involves ‘protection’ in whatever form that may be.