The present topic has been extensively addressed by several authors during the 1990s. It has provoked harsh polemics and a passionate debate and still represents an issue of interest for the international lawyers, as no formal and complete answer to the question of the international judicial review has been brought to this day. This article tries to put forward an effective and efficient mechanism allowing the International Court of Justice to review the resolutions adopted by the Security Council in the realm of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The approach of the subject is favourable to an international judicial review, which would render the intervention of the Council more legitimate, hence more easily accepted by states. The proposed method of judicial review must however ensure both the legitimacy and the efficiency of the political organ and strengthen, not weaken the United Nations' role in the maintenance of international peace and security. That is why the international judicial review mechanism should be carefully defined and should confer upon the international judge a limited power of appreciation. At the same time, the other international courts and tribunals should defer to the International Court on matters concerning the legality of the Security Council's coercive measures by means of a preliminary ruling mechanism.

Hall's statement, widely quoted by writers on State succession, has retained a good deal of its validity. From Grotius to O'Connell, a long series of distinguished publicists have attempted to throw light upon the doctrinal obscurity of the problem. Many of them have displayed remarkable juristic imagination, but have also shown a regrettable lack of precision and discipline. In their justification, however, it must be conceded that the abundant judicial and diplomatic practice on State succession has always been—and still is—contradictory and obscure.

The current discussions on establishing a so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO) have their origin no doubt in both the poor performance of the first UN Development Decade and the profound changes — apparent since the early seventies — in world political and economic relations.

In the long-lasting debate about reforming the United Nations, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appeared to want to make a difference. On the basis of a report prepared by a high level panel of experts he presented his own reform proposals in March 2005. At the beginning of 2005 a voluminous report on the development issue, the so-called Millennium Project Report (or ‘Sachs-Report’), was presented. On the basis of these documents an intense discussion set in. Despite the fact that the immediate result of this debate, the so-called 2005 World Summit Outcome of September 2005 was rather disappointing, the world community has now at their disposal an array of detailed studies and reports on some of the most topical issues in international law. As reform of the United Nations seems to be imperative the relative discussion will continue. This article aims at examining the strengths and faults of the documents mentioned and highlighting the extent to which the positions to be found therein are corresponding to the main structural elements of the international order presently in force. Finally, the article also considers whether these proposals are opening suitable avenues for a further development of UN law.

It is unlikely that anyone would seriously reject the notion that the prohibition on torture has reached the status of a jus cogens norm in international law. On the contrary, the weight of authority in favour of this status is overwhelming. However, the effect in international law of a jus cogens norm, and of the norm which prohibits torture in particular, has yet to be fully worked out. The differences between the majority and minority judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom are urgent reminders of the uncertainty of litigation in areas of human rights law whose norms are the subject of seemingly overwhelming moral imperatives.

The Liberian conflict was a violent response to the tyranny and misrule of the then President, Samuel Doe. Doe had come to power after staging a coup d'état in 1980. After five years of military dictatorship, and due to pressure for political reform, Doe's military junta agreed to a programme of democratization which culminated in Doe being elected, allegedly fraudulently, as the first president of the new republic. Notwithstanding its professed commitment to constitutionalism and the rule of law, the violation of human rights continued under the new civilian regime. These human rights abuses, coupled with a growing economic crisis, led to the outbreak of the conflict.

The article deals with Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), of 28 April 2004. In it the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists, imposed obligations on states. Brief observations on the concept of legislation are followed by comments on instances of near legislation by the Council and on Resolution 1373 (2001), of 28 September 2001, in which the Council, reacting under Chapter VII, and unanimously to the dreadful terrorist attacks of the 11th of that month, took measures fully comparable to legislation. Resolution 1373 (2001) imposed on states rules and principles already sanctioned by the General Assembly, which ties in with the lack of any trace of the preparatory work on the resolution, adopted so to speak instantaneously. In contrast, Resolution 1540 (2004), which imposed on states entirely new rules, arose from a protracted and officially mentioned process of private consultations leading to two open Security Council meetings, at which many states commented on the draft resolution under consideration, questioning its constitutionality and pointing to problems of interpretation and application it raised. Those issues, which did not prevent the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1540 (2004), are the main topic of the article.

Arbitration is an institution which preceded courts; yet shortly after the appearance of the latter, arbitration assumed the position of the younger (and weaker) brother. In the course of history, this predicament has only been confirmed and aggravated. Courts of justice have become the representatives of the ‘normal’ settlement of disputes, their legitimacy has been beyond doubt Arbitration has been reduced to an exception, the limits and the functioning of which have been firmly been controlled by courts. There have been revolts against this plight, yet there is practically only one area in which such revolts have really been successful. This is in the domain of international trade. Today, it is an uncontested fact that arbitration is the dominant method of settling international trade disputes; and at the same time, international commercial arbitration has become an almost completely self-sufficient institution. While gaining ground and strength, international commercial arbitration has also gained self-confidence. It has been stressed with increasing frequency (and determination) that the self-reliance of international commercial arbitration is a virtue, and that it advances broader common causes. In the opening sentence of his article on court intervention in arbitral proceedings, Delaume stresses: ‘It is generally recognized that, in order to be fully effective, transnational arbitration must be freed from judicial interference.’

On 7 July 1989 the European Court of Human Rights reached a landmark decision in the case of Jens Soering. In the case of a pending extradition, the requested State, a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, violated Article 3 of the Convention if the fugitive, after surrender, faced the real risk of being subjected to ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.

Compared to other international dispute settlement bodies, the European Court of Human Rights' case law is relatively rich in situations involving a single injury and multiple contributing states. This contribution examines how the ECtHR decides such cases and explores to what extent its approach corresponds to that of the work of the International Law Commission on the topic of international responsibility. The article critically discusses the substantive criteria and doctrinal foundations employed by the ECtHR for allocating responsibility. It reflects on the adequacy of the doctrines used and examines how they can contribute to the general law on shared responsibility.

The elaboration of international legal standards relating to the status of women in the Commission on the Status of Women has led to an increased interest within the Commission with the problem of the implementation of these principles for, as Landy states:

“the adoption of international legislation and its formal acceptance by a growing number of countries cannot, by themselves, add to the stability of inter-State relations, unless there also exists some degree of assurance that the contracting parties really comply with their obligations…”

An examination of the practice of United Nations organs, including the International Court of Justice, discloses no rules requiring a party who invokes an international agreement before any of those organs to show compliance with Article 102. Nor have we found any instance in which an organ has imposed the penalty of Article 102(2) or in which a party has urged it to do so. This is not to say that no United Nations organ has ever been confronted with an agreement that required registration but which had not been registered. A number of the contentious cases before the International Court presented just such a situation. As will appear from the discussion of cases which follows, the instances in which it can be said that the Court gave effect to such unregistered agreements all involved so-called Special Agreements by which, under Article 36 of the Court's Statute, parties may bring their cases before the Court. This raises the questions whether the Court considers such agreements to be outside the scope of Article 102, and if so, why.