1. From May 20 to June 10, 1958 a Conference of Plenipotentiaries met at Headquarters of the United Nations in New York for the purpose of concluding a convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.

Aux termes de l'article premier de la Convention sur la haute mer conclue à Genève le 29 avril 1958, «on entend par «haute mer» toutes les parties de la mer n'appartenant pas à la mer territoriale ou aux eaux intérieures d'un Etat ».

Ce qui frappe à la lecture de cet article, c'est le caractère négatif de la définition qu'elle contient: la haute mer y est décrite comme ce qui reste de « la mer », déduction faite de « la mer territoriale » et des « eaux intérieures ».

When on 3 October 1957 the Russian astronaut Gagarin was launched into outer space and when twelve years later on 20 July 1969 the American astronauts Armstrong and Aldrin landed on the Moon, the enthusiasm of the world population for these two events was enormous.

For someone who has spent his whole career in the search for international order and stability it is a particular honour and pleasure to be giving this Memorial Lecture.

This article is a prospective analysis of whether the established principles for delimitation of the continental shelf within 200 NM will apply for delimitation of outer continental margins. On the basis of the established normative jurisprudence of delimitations within 200 NM it can namely not be ruled out that the established equitable criteria and methods for delimitation, for finding an equitable solution, were solely set to prevail in delimitations within 200 NM.

Title commands delimitation and the title for the zone beyond 200 NM differ from the title within 200 NM. Wherein the distance criterion is the title for the zone within 200 NM, geological and geomorphologic criteria are the basis of the title for the legal continental shelf that extends 200 NM. Accordingly, the established normative principles in delimitation of continental shelves beyond 200 NM are susceptible to differ from the established prevailing principles within 200 NM and may have an important impact on delimitations in the continental outer margins.

In conclusion it is held that the established equitable criteria and methods in order to find an equitable solution in delimitations within 200 NM are likely not to apply mutatis mutandis for delimitations beyond 200 NM

Since 1 March 2001, family courts in the European Union (except Denmark) have been obliged to follow the rules of EC Regulation No. 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility for Children of Both Spouses. The Regulation was meant to complement the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 27 September 1968, and that is why it has come to be known as the ‘Brussels II Regulation’. The Convention covers, roughly speaking, patrimonial matters – such as property, contracts and torts – while the Regulation deals with divorce and child custody. On 1 March 2002, another Regulation entered into force, replacing the Brussels Convention and therefore aptly called the ‘Brussels I Regulation’. However, ‘Brussels I’ does not apply in Denmark, and that means that the Brussels Convention is still in force as between Denmark and the other EU member states. To complicate matters further, another Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters continues to apply in all EU member states, as well as in Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Poland: the Lugano Convention of 1988. Its text is virtually identical to that of the Brussels Convention, but there are major differences between the Lugano Convention and the Brussels I Regulation. As far as patrimonial matters are concerned, the courts in Europe now have to juggle with three different sets of rules: the Brussels I Regulation, the Brussels Convention and the Lugano Convention.

Although Professor Van Eikema Hommes' article “Grotius on Natural and International Law” contains some acute observations, it is submitted that it provides an incorrect view of Grotius' methodology, which results in a one-sided description of his system of international law. The aim of this paper is to criticize this view through a more careful exposition of Grotius' methodology, and from this to derive a broad insight into the basics of his law of nations, in particular the law of war and natural law, which will be assessed in the light of modern conceptions.

As human behaviour is influenced by law, so law is influenced by human behaviour whenever the latter serves to bring about changes in existing legal situations. Law may be substituted for freedom of action; a regime of freedom may be restored where law prevailed; one set of rules may be succeeded by another set of rules. What are the kinds of human behaviour capable of so changing legal situations, and thereby entitled to the name “sources of law”? Here, an obvious distinction presents itself between material behaviour, and acts of communication with regard to future behaviour. A further classification would segregate mere acts of acceptance or rejection from positive behaviour contributing substance to the law. Let us illustrate these distinctions by examples from international relations.

On 31 May 2002, the EC Regulation on insolvency proceedings entered into force. As from that date, insolvency proceedings that are opened in any of the Member States of the European Union will in principle qualify for recognition in the other Member States, with the exception of the Kingdom of Denmark. On the whole, the Regulation contains the same provisions as the European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings that was ready for signature in 1995, but which never entered into force. Like the 1995 Convention, the present Regulation mainly contains provisions pertaining to the conflict of laws and only a few rules of uniform law. Moreover, the Regulation contains the same plurality of insolvency proceedings as the 1995 Convention: in addition to main insolvency proceedings that are recognised in the other Member States, territorial insolvency proceedings may be opened in the Member States where the debtor has an establishment.

The problem of financing the United Nations—a recurrent problem in fact since 1945—has become an acute financial and political one, since 1956. In November 1956 and in December 1960, the General Assembly decided to assess UN members part of the expenditures incurred for peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and Congo in accord with the scale approved for raising the ordinary annual budget.