The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil: Interests, Identities, and Institutions in Comparative Politics. By Barry Ames. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 352p. $59.50

Extract

Students of Brazil, of various disciplinary and theoretical persuasions, have long sought to explain the seeming inability of the country's political leadership to transcend patronage politics and develop coherent policies suitable for transforming the country's enormous potential into sustained economic growth and greater social equity. The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil by Barry Ames, is the most recent major work in this tradition. Grounded in rational choice principles, the book's core argument is that political institutions—namely, open-list proportional representation in districts of high magnitude, coupled with federalism and the executive's long-standing reliance on patronage and pork—are at the heart of Brazil's governability problems. The proliferation of veto players, the continued weakness of political parties, legislative obstructionism, and corruption are among the most pernicious effects of the system.