Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Extract

Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. By Derek D. Smith. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 197p. $75.00 cloth, $24.99 paper.

By the early 1990s, scholars and policymakers alike began voicing reservations about the ability of deterrence strategies to counter nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals as these weapons proliferated into the hands of state and nonstate actors. Some observers doubted if it was technically feasible to create credible deterrent commitments given the possibility that there might be no significant targets in the opposing camp to hold at risk, that potential opponents were irrational or suicidal, or that it might be impossible to identify the culprits who launched the attack itself (e.g., the origins of an epidemic might never be identified). Others doubted the strategic wisdom of relying on deterrence, given that the costs of policy failure were potentially catastrophic. And, as the September 11 terrorist attacks demonstrated, overwhelming military superiority cannot deter or defend against terrorist cells that are willing to sacrifice themselves to achieve their objectives. Because of the inherent limitations of deterrence, many suggested that preventive war and preemption were the best way to deal with rogue states and terrorist organizations that were acquiring weapons of mass destruction.