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Trust and Mistrust in International Relations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 August 2006

Branislav L. Slantchev
Branislav L. Slantchev
Affiliation:
University of California-San Diego
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Extract

Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. By Andrew H. Kydd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 284p. $39.50.

That cooperation is at best difficult and at worst impossible in the anarchic international system is an established idea. Analyses usually assume that state preferences put them in a prisoner's dilemma where defection is the strictly dominant strategy. Explaining cooperation means showing why actors forgo the short-term benefits of exploiting others. Mechanisms involve conditional play, institutional arrangements, and hegemonic leadership, which help overcome coordination, monitoring, enforcement, and free-rider problems.

Type
BOOK REVIEWS: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Information
Perspectives on Politics , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , September 2006 , pp. 632 - 633
Copyright
© 2006 American Political Science Association

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