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Homeostasis, Higher Taxa, and Monophyly

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Richard Boyd
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Abstract

Several authors have argued that higher taxa are monophyletic homeostatic property cluster natural kinds. On the traditional definition of monophyly, this will not work: the emergence of taxon-defining homeostatic property clusters would not always correspond to unique speciation events. An alternative conception of monophyly is developed and advocated, which can accommodate the homeostatic property cluster proposal. Recent work in philosophy of science shows that it meets appropriate standards of objectivity and precision.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 77 , Issue 5 , December 2010 , pp. 686 - 701
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Thanks to Mark Ereshefsky, Brent Mishler, and Olivier Rieppel for valuable discussions.

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