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Heritability and Genetic Causation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
The method in human genetics of ascribing causal responsibility to genotype by the use of heritability estimates has been heavily criticized over the years. It has been argued that these estimates are rarely valid and do not trace genetic causation. Recent contributions strike back at this criticism. I present and discuss two opposing views on these matters represented by Richard Lewontin and Neven Sesardic. I suggest that the conflicting perspectives are based in differing concepts of genetic causation and differing motivations and contexts of discussion. I use the distinction between structuring and triggering causes to clarify the basis for the opposing views.
- Type
- Topics in Philosophy of Biology
- Information
- Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 699 - 709
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
I would like to thank Nils Roll-Hansen, Anders Strand, John Dupré, Richard Lewontin, and the colloquium of the Ethics Program at the University of Oslo for helpful discussions, comments and suggestions, and Cynthia Shen for editing parts of the manuscript. Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at a Workshop in Physics and Biology: Reduction and Complexity at the University of Oslo in September 2004 and in the Seminar of the Life Sciences Research Group at Harvard University in October 2004. I am grateful for the feedback I received on these occasions and at the 2004 PSA biannual meeting. Financial Support for this work was provided from The Ethics Program and The Faculty of Arts at the University of Oslo and from the Fulbright Foundation.
References
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