The ability to veto legislation is the most important formal power of the presidency in the legislative process, and presidents' veto behavior has thus attracted a great deal of theoretical interest. Game-theoretic models of congressional—presidential interactions explain vetoes by incorporating incomplete information over the distribution of presidential or congressional types. In this article, I examine two prominent such theories, as well as a simple “noisy” extension of a complete information theory. I show that each makes strong predictions not only about vetoes themselves but also about the resulting override votes; given that overrides are so closely connected with vetoes, any valid theory of the latter must be able to successfully explain the former. I test these predictions empirically and show that support for each of these theories in presidential veto and override data from 1973 to 2008 is quite weak. This negative result suggests that current models of the veto are incomplete; I sketch some possibilities for extension in the conclusion.

Social scientists spend considerable energy constructing typologies and discussing their roles in measurement. Less discussed is the role of typologies in evaluating and revising theoretical arguments. We argue that unsupervised machine learning tools can be profitably applied to the development and testing of theory-based typologies. We review recent advances in mixture models as applied to cluster analysis and argue that these tools are particularly important in the social sciences where it is common to claim that high-dimensional objects group together in meaningful clusters. Model-based clustering (MBC) grounds analysis in probability theory, permitting the evaluation of uncertainty and application of information-based model selection tools. We show that the MBC approach forces analysts to consider dimensionality problems that more traditional clustering tools obscure. We apply MBC to the “varieties of capitalism,” a typology receiving significant attention in political science and economic sociology. We find weak and conflicting evidence for the theory's expected grouping. We therefore caution against the current practice of including typology-derived dummy variables in regression and case-comparison research designs.

We examine the trade-offs associated with using Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) interface for subject recruitment. We first describe MTurk and its promise as a vehicle for performing low-cost and easy-to-field experiments. We then assess the internal and external validity of experiments performed using MTurk, employing a framework that can be used to evaluate other subject pools. We first investigate the characteristics of samples drawn from the MTurk population. We show that respondents recruited in this manner are often more representative of the U.S. population than in-person convenience samples—the modal sample in published experimental political science—but less representative than subjects in Internet-based panels or national probability samples. Finally, we replicate important published experimental work using MTurk samples.

The concept of electoral competition is relevant to a variety of research agendas in political science, yet the question of how to measure electoral competition has received little direct attention. We revisit the distinction proposed by Giovanni Sartori between competition as a structure or rule of the game and competitiveness as an outcome of that game and argue that to understand which elections can be lost (and therefore when parties and leaders are potentially threatened by electoral accountability), scholars may be better off considering the full range of elections where competition is allowed. We provide a data set of all national elections between 1945 and 2006 and a measure of whether each election event is structured such that the competition is possible. We outline the pitfalls of other measures used by scholars to define the potential for electoral competition and show that such methods can lead to biased or incomplete findings. The new global data on elections and the minimal conditions necessary for electoral competition are introduced, followed by an empirical illustration of the differences between the proposed measure of competition and existing methods used to infer the existence of competition.

Recent research finds that, for social desirability reasons, uninformed individuals disproportionately give “neither agree nor disagree” type responses to survey attitude questions, even when a “do not know” option is available. Such “face-saving” responses inflate the indifference (i.e., middle) categories of ordered attitude variables with nonordered responses. When such inflation occurs within the middle category of one's ordered dependent variable, estimates from ordered probit (and ordered logit) models are likely to be unreliable and inefficient. This article develops a set of mixture models that estimate and account for the presence of “face-saving” responses in middle categories of ordered survey response variables, and applies these models to (1) simulated data and (2) a commonly studied survey question measuring attitudes toward European Union (EU) membership among individuals in EU-candidate countries. Results from the survey data set and the Monte Carlo experiments suggest that, when middle category inflation is present in one's ordered dependent variable, the estimates obtained from middle category mixture models are less biased than—and in some cases substantively distinct from—the estimates obtained from “naive” ordered probit models.

“Testing Theories of Congressional-Presidential Interaction with Veto Override Rates” (henceforth “Veto Override Rates”) offers several tests of two models of vetoes and finds the models wanting. The paper concludes that something is seriously amiss with the models. In my view, the problem lies not in the models but in the tests. Understanding why the tests miss the mark is helpful in understanding models of veto politics, and more generally in thinking about testing strategies when multiple models analyze different causal mechanisms that hold under different circumstances. I should note immediately that the effort in the paper to think hard about override rates is admirable; it simply does not go far enough.

The Cox proportional hazards model is ubiquitous in time-to-event studies of political processes. Plausible deviations from correct specification and operationalization caused by problems such as measurement error or omitted variables can produce substantial bias when the Cox model is estimated by conventional partial likelihood maximization (PLM). One alternative is an iteratively reweighted robust (IRR) estimator, which can reduce this bias. However, the utility of IRR is limited by the fact that there is currently no method for determining whether PLM or IRR is more appropriate for a particular sample of data. Here, we develop and evaluate a novel test for selecting between the two estimators. Then, we apply the test to political science data. We demonstrate that PLM and IRR can each be optimal, that our test is effective in choosing between them, and that substantive conclusions can depend on which one is used.

Is it possible to detect manipulation by looking only at electoral returns? Drawing on work in psychology, we exploit individuals' biases in generating numbers to highlight suspicious digit patterns in reported vote counts. First, we show that fair election procedures produce returns where last digits occur with equal frequency, but laboratory experiments indicate that individuals tend to favor some numerals over others, even when subjects have incentives to properly randomize. Second, individuals underestimate the likelihood of digit repetition in sequences of random integers, so we should observe relatively few instances of repeated numbers in manipulated vote tallies. Third, laboratory experiments demonstrate a preference for pairs of adjacent digits, which suggests that such pairs should be abundant on fraudulent return sheets. Fourth, subjects avoid pairs of distant numerals, so those should appear with lower frequency on tainted returns. We test for deviations in digit patterns using data from Sweden's 2002 parliamentary elections, Senegal's 2000 and 2007 presidential elections, and previously unavailable results from Nigeria's 2003 presidential election. In line with observers' expectations, we find substantial evidence that manipulation occurred in Nigeria as well as in Senegal in 2007.

Empirical researchers studying party systems often struggle with the question of how to count parties. Indexes of party system fragmentation used to address this problem (e.g., the effective number of parties) have a fundamental shortcoming: since the same index value may represent very different party systems, they are impossible to interpret and may lead to erroneous inference. We offer a novel approach to this problem: instead of focusing on index measures, we develop a model that predicts the entire distribution of party vote-shares and, thus, does not require any index measure. First, a model of party counts predicts the number of parties. Second, a set of multivariate t models predicts party vote-shares. Compared to the standard index-based approach, our approach helps to avoid inferential errors and, in addition, yields a much richer set of insights into the variation of party systems. For illustration, we apply the model on two data sets. Our analyses call into question the conclusions one would arrive at by the index-based approach. Software is provided to implement the proposed model.

Political scientists often study dollar-denominated outcomes that are zero for some observations. These zeros can arise because the data-generating process is granular: The observed outcome results from aggregation of a small number of discrete projects or grants, each of varying dollar size. This article describes the use of a compound distribution in which each observed outcome is the sum of a Poisson—distributed number of gamma distributed quantities, a special case of the Tweedie distribution. Regression models based on this distribution estimate loglinear marginal effects without either the ad hoc treatment of zeros necessary to use a log-dependent variable regression or the change in quantity of interest necessary to use a tobit or selection model. The compound Poisson—gamma regression is compared with commonly applied approaches in an application to data on high-speed rail grants from the United States federal government to the states, and against simulated data from several data-generating processes.

The relationship between a party's popular vote share and legislative seat share—its seats—votes swing ratio—is a key characteristic of democratic representation. This article introduces a general approach to estimating party-specific swing ratios in multiparty legislative elections, given results from only a single election. I estimate the joint density of party vote shares across districts using a finite mixture model for compositional data and then computationally evaluate this distribution to produce parties' expected change in legislative seats for plausible changes in their vote share. The method easily extends to systems with any number of parties, employing both majoritarian and proportional electoral rules. Applications to legislative elections in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Botswana demonstrate how parties' swing ratios vary both within countries and over time, indicating that parties under majoritarian electoral rules are subject to unique and possibly divergent geographic—political constraints.

In recent years, a consensus has developed that the conditional logit (CL) model is the most appropriate strategy for modeling government choice. In this paper, we reconsider this approach and make three methodological contributions. First, we employ a mixed logit with random coefficients that allows us to take account of unobserved heterogeneity in the government formation process and relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. Second, we demonstrate that the procedure used in the literature to test the IIA assumption is biased against finding IIA violations. An improved testing procedure reveals clear evidence of IIA violations, indicating that the CL model is inappropriate. Third, we move beyond simply presenting the sign and significance of model coefficients, suggesting various strategies for interpreting the substantive influence of variables in models of government choice.