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Can Biological, Toxin, and Chemical Warfare be Eliminated?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Meryl Nass
Meryl Nass*
Affiliation:
Wing Memorial Hospital and University of Massachusetts, USA
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Extract

Is it possible to prevent biological, chemical, and toxin warfare from occurring? The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), an international treaty banning the possession and hostile use of biological and toxin weapons, already exists; and a similar chemical weapons treaty is currently being negotiated. The older Geneva Protocol of 1925 bans the “first use” of these weapons in war. It might seem that the threat of use of these weapons of mass destruction is nearly at an end.

Type
Roundtable Commentaries
Information
Politics and the Life Sciences , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , February 1992 , pp. 30 - 32
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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