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Duisenberg and Trichet: Measures of their Degree of Conservatism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Ibrahima Diouf  and
Dominique Pépin
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Summary

This paper suggests, on the basis of the New Keynesian model, a measure of the degree of conservatism of the European Central Banker. At first, we notice that the appointment of the President of the European Central Bank was made after substantive disagreements about the degree of conservatism (institutional and personal) of the candidates. Secondly, we apply this measure to the change of presidency (from Duisenberg to Trichet) in order to explore the possibility of a step change in the conduct of the ECB's monetary policy. Finally, our results show that once appointed, the two Central Bankers adapted to the institutional framework in which they made decisions.

Résumé

Résumé

Cette étude propose, sur la base d'un modèle nouveau keynésien, une mesure du degré de conservatisme du Banquier central européen. Dans un premier temps, nous constatons que la désignation du président de la Banque Centrale Européenne s'est faite sur fond de mésententes à propos du degré de conservatisme (institutionnel et personnel) des candidats en lice. Dans un second temps, nous appliquons cette mesure au changement de présidence (Duisenberg/Trichet), afin d'apprécier l'existence éventuelle d'une rupture dans la conduite de la politique monétaire. Finalement, ce travail permet d'établir qu'une fois désignés les Banquiers centraux s'adaptent au cadre institutionnel dans lequel ils prennent leurs décisions.

Keywords

Banque centrale européennedegré de conservatismepolitique monétaireE52E58Degree of ConservatismEuropean Central BankMonetary PolicyE52E58
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 76 , Issue 2 , 2010 , pp. 145 - 162
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2010 

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Footnotes

*

CRIEF, Université de Poitiers, UFR Sciences Économiques, 93 avenue du Recteur Pineau, 86000 Poitiers, France. Tél. +33 (0)5 49 45 41 53, ibrahima.diouf@univ-poitiers.fr (auteur de contact), dominique.pepin@univ-poitiers.fr.

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