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Exclusion par manipulation des marchés de permis d'émission

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Sonia Schwartz  and
C.A.E. Université Paul Cézanne
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Résumé

Cet article traite de l'exclusion par manipulation des marchés de permis d'émission. Dans un premier temps, nous déterminons la valeur de l'exclusion que le permis représente. Puis, nous définissons la stratégie de surachat des permis et évaluons son impact sur le prix du permis. Nous en tirons alors un certain nombre de conclusions en termes de dotations initiales et de politique économique, après avoir illustré ces résultats par une application numérique.

Summary

Summary

This article examines the exclusionary manipulation effects of a pollution permit market. The exclusion value of a pollution permit and the overbuying strategy are determined. Then, the consequences of the exclusionary manipulation on the permit price are given. We give some economic policy advises as far as initial allocations are concerned.

Keywords

pollution permitpredationinitial allocationQ28D43L42permis d'emissionprédationdotation initialeQ28D43L42
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 73 , Issue 1 , 2007 , pp. 95 - 119
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2007 

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Footnotes

*

L'auteur remercie l'Agence de l'Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l'Énergie pour son soutient financier, les participants aux colloques Sesame d'Aix-en-Provence (2002), JMA de Montpellier (2003) et au congrès de l'AFSE de Paris (2003), ainsi que les rapporteurs anonymes de la revue Recherches Économiques de Louvain.

**

C.A.E. Université Paul Cézanne, Aix-Marseille III, 3 avenue Robert Schuman, 13628 Aix-en-Provence cedex 1, FRANCE. Tel : +334 42 17 29 93. E-mail : sonia.schwartz@univ-cezanne.fr

References

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