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L'absence d'envie ; une introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

William Thomson
William Thomson*
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
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Résumé

Cet article est une introduction élémentaire à la littérature concernant l'analyse du concept d'une allocation «sans envie», c'est à dire une allocation telle que chaque personne préfère son panier de consommation au panier de toute autre personne. Nous présentons une liste des mérites de cette définition et une liste de ses limitations.

Summary

Summary

This article is an elementary introduction to the literature devoted to the analysis of the concept of an “envy-free” allocation, that is to say an allocation such that every agent prefers his consumption bundle to anyone else's consumption bundle. We list the merits of this definition as well as its limitations.

Keywords

D63D63
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 60 , Issue 1 , March 1994 , pp. 43 - 61
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1994 

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Footnotes

(*)

Cette note a été préparée pour la conférence sur l’Absence d’Envie qui s’est tenue à Louvain-la-Neuve sous les auspices de la Chaire Hoover, en décembre 1993. Je voudrais remercier les organisateurs et les participants, en particulier Ph. Van Parijs et C. Arnsperger.

References

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