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Oligopoly Equilibria “à la Stackelberg” in Pure Exchange Economies1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Ludovic A. Julien  and
Fabrice Tricou
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Summary

This paper introduces two equilibrium concepts which extend the notion of Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmarks of Cournot-Walras economies and of strategic market games, the introduction of an active leader modifies the working of market power and the configuration of strategic interactions. In the context of a simple pure exchange economy, asymptotic identification and welfare results are thus obtained, about Stackelberg general equilibria, compared to Cournot general equilibria and to the competitive equilibrium.

Résumé

Résumé

Cet article propose une transposition de la concurrence à la Stackelberg dans un contexte d'équilibre général. Deux nouveaux concepts d'équilibre général stratégique sont proposés : l'équilibre de Stackelberg-Walras et l'équilibre de Stackelberg-Cournot. Ces deux concepts d'équilibre sont définis de manière générale dans le contexte d'une économie d'échange pur. L'introduction d'un leader complexifie la nature des interactions stratégiques à l'oeuvre. Elle affecte aussi les manifestations et les conséquences du pouvoir de marché. Ces deux concepts d'équilibre sont ensuite caractérisés dans le contexte d'un exemple, et des comparaisons en termes de bien-être sont effectuées avec d'autres concepts d'équilibre général stratégique.

Keywords

équilibre généralconcurrence oligopolistiqueD43D51General EquilibriumOligopolistic CompetitionD43D51
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 76 , Issue 2 , 2010 , pp. 175 - 194
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2010 

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Footnotes

*

EconomiX, University Paris Ouest-Nanterre La Defense, Bureau K116, 200, avenue de la Republique, 92001 Nanterre Cedex, Iudovic.julien@u-paris10.fr, fabrice.tricou@u-paris10.fr

1

A first version of this paper was presented at the conference "Economics of information" that held at the University of Paris X in June 2007. We acknowledge R. Breton, B. Crettez and P. A. Jouvet for their remarks. We are especially grateful to an anonymous referee whom suggestions improved the quality of the paper.

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