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On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Eric Langlais
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Summary

In this paper, the unilateral divorce law is modelled through the combination of exclusive rights on the marriage dissolution and alternative compensation rules benefiting to the parent having custody of the children. Their influence are studied both in the short run (probability and efficiency of divorce) and in the long run (selection of marriages). We show that a decrease in the costs of divorce proceedings has by no means commonplace consequences on marriage contracting; particularly when consideration of parents' altruism and child support is introduced, more marriages are contracted when the cost of divorces decreases.

Résumé

Résumé

Le divorce unilatéral est modélisé ici en combinant des droit exclusifs sur la dissolution du marriage et différentes règles de compensations en faveur du parent qui a la garde des enfants. On étudie leurs effets de court terme (fréquence et efficacité du divorce) comme de long terme (sélection des marriages). Une baisse des coûts liés à la procédure de divorce a des effets qui ne sont pas triviaux pour la formation des mariages ; en particulier, lorsque l'on prend en compte l'altruisme des parents et les dispositions financières en faveur des enfants de couples divorcés, il apparaît qu'un plus grand nombre de mariages peuvent être conclus alors que le coût du divorce diminue.

Keywords

modèles du mariagedivorce unilatéralaltruisme parental et mesures protectives en faveur des enfantsD1K10K12K41J12marriage modelsunilateral divorce lawthe parents' altruism and protective measures for childrenD1K10K12K41J12
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 76 , Issue 3 , 2010 , pp. 229 - 256
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2010 

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Footnotes

*

University Nancy 2, UFR AES, 4 Rue de la Ravinelle - CO 7026, 54035 Nancy cedex, France; tel: 03 83 19 27 60; Eric.Langlais@univ-nancy2.fr.

**

I am grateful to Yannick Gabuthy and Nuno Garoupa for their comments on a previous draft of the paper, and also to the referees of the journal for their stimulating criticisms and suggestions. As usual, all remaining errors are mine.

References

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