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Systèmes de retraite et redistribution intragénérationnelle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Pascal Belan
Pascal Belan*
Affiliation:
GREQAM
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Résumé

Nous considérons un modèle à générations imbriquées en économie fermée avec des travailleurs qualifiés et des travailleurs non qualifiés. Il existe un système de retraite obligatoire qui se décompose en deux branches: une branche avec financement par répartition, cotisations proportionnelles aux salaires et prestations uniformes et une branche basée sur le double principe de la capitalisation et de la commutati-vité. Nous étudions la solution optimale stationnaire choisie par un planificateur qui maximise un critère de bien-être social utilitariste. Nous montrons que, si l'économie sans système de retraite est en sous-accumulation mais pas trop éloignée de la règle d'or ou en suraccumulation, il est optimal d'introduire les deux systèmes.

Summary

Summary

We consider an overlapping generations model of closed economy with skilled and unskilled workers. There exists a mandatory public pension system with two components: a pay-as-you-go system with uniform benefits and a fully funded system with earnings-related benefits. We study the optimal steady state path that maximises an utilitarist social welfare function. We show that, if the economy without public pension is under-capitalized but not too distant from Golden-Rule or over-capitalized, it is optimal to introduce the two systems.

Keywords

H55O41H55O41
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 63 , Issue 1 , 1997 , pp. 57 - 77
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1997 

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Footnotes

(*)

Je remercie Philippe Michel pour ses suggestions et ses précieux conseils tout au long de l'élaboration de cet article. Je remercie également Pierre Pestieau pour ses commentaires sur une première version de ce texte. Enfin, je remercie Bertrand Cretez, Jean Pierre Vidal et Bertrand Wigniolle qui ont relu une version préliminaire et m'ont apporté leurs commentaires.

References

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