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Une étude expérimentale de la forte stabilité*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Abdoul Aziz Ndiaye
Abdoul Aziz Ndiaye*
Affiliation:
LARES‡, Université Gaston Berger de Saint-Louis du Sénégal
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Résumé

Dans cet article, nous étudions la forte stabilité d'une règle de vote telle que définie par Dutta et al. [2001] par l'intermédiaire de la méthode expérimentale. Dans ce sens, une règle de vote est dite fortement stable si le vainqueur de l'élection reste inchangé après une tentative de manipulation par candidature stratégique d'un candidat potentiel. Dans le cadre d'une élection avec trois candidats en lice et d'un électorat de petite taille, nous évaluons de façon expérimentale les fréquences de la forte stabilité des règles de vote parlementaires et de la pluralité.

Summary

Summary

In this paper, we study the strong candidate stability of a voting procedure as denned by Dutta et al. [2001] through the experimental method. In this sense, a voting rule is said to be strongly candidate stable if the winner of the election remains unchanged after an attempted manipulation by strategic candidacy of a potential candidate. In an election with three candidates and a small electorate, we evaluate experimentally frequencies of the strong candidate stability of parliamentary voting rules and plurality.

Keywords

strategic candidacystrong candidate stabilityexperimental methodfrequenciesparliamentary voting rulespluralityD71candidature stratégiqueforte stabilitéméthode expérimentalefréquencesrègles de vote parlementairespluralitéD71
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 80 , Issue 1 , 2014 , pp. 89 - 103
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2015 

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Footnotes

*

Nous traduisons la “strong candidate stability” de DJL [2001] par la forte stabilité.

†

Nous tenons à remercier Guillaume Hollard de I’Université de Paris 1 et Mamadou Abdoulaye Konté de I’Université Gaston Berger de Saint-Louis pour leurs remarques et suggestions très pertinentes.

‡

Laboratoire de Recherches Economiques de Saint-Louis, Université Gaston Berger, BP : 234.

References

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