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Can Belief in God be Confirmed?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Mark S. McLeod
Affiliation:
Westmont College, Santa Barbara, California, U.S.A.

Extract

A basic thrust behind Alvin Plantinga's position that belief in God is properly basic is an analogy between certain non-religious (and presumably justified) beliefs such as ‘I see a tree’ and theistic beliefs such as ‘God made this flower’. Each kind of belief is justified for a believer, argues Plantinga, when she finds herself in a certain set of conditions. Richard Grigg challenges this claim by arguing that while the non-religious beliefs are confirmed, beliefs about God are not. I wish to explore this challenge, clarify it and suggest that on one understanding it is irrelevant and on another it is false.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988

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References

page 311 note 1 References are as follows. (Alston) Alston, William P., ‘Christian Experience and Christian Belief. (Plantinga) Alvin Plantinga, Reason and Belief in God.Google Scholar Both in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, edited by Plantinga, Alvin and Wolterstorf, Nicholas (Notre Dame: University Press).Google Scholar (Grigg) Grigg, Richard, Theism and Proper Basicality: A Response to PlantingaGoogle Scholar, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, XIV (1983), 123–7. For the development of the analogy discussed here, see Plantinga's essay.

page 315 note 1 Plantinga does give the following example of a properly basic belief: ‘This vast and intricate universe was created by God’ (Plantinga: 80). It seems not to be the best example, however, for it breaks the analogy between the paradigm beliefs and other beliefs about God. Although one could conceivably believe ‘I see the world’, it is not a belief which describes a literal case of perception.