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A Gödelian ontological argument improved

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2009

ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, One Bear Place #97273, Waco, TX 76798–7273 e-mail: Alexander_Pruss@baylor.edu
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Abstract

Gödel's ontological argument is a formal argument for a being defined in terms of the concept of a positive property. I shall defend several versions of Gödel's argument, using weaker premises than Anderson's (1990) version, and avoiding Oppy's (1996 and 2000) parody refutations.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , September 2009 , pp. 347 - 353
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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