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Naturalism, theism, and multiply realizable mental states

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 February 2017

KEVIN VANDERGRIFF
KEVIN VANDERGRIFF*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, California State University Sacramento, Sacramento, California, 95819, USA
*
e-mail: kevinvandergriff@yahoo.com
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Abstract

Paul Draper has argued that the scientific evidence for the dependence of mental states upon brain states provides a good reason for thinking that theism is very probably false because the extreme metaphysical dualism implied by theism makes it antecedently likely, if God exists, that minds should be fundamentally non-physical entities. However, Draper's argument assumes that what makes God's mind a mind is the immaterial stuff it is made of. But that assumption is potentially faulty. Why? Because, if functionalism is true, then all conceivable minds are fundamentally functional entities identified by what they do, rather than by what they are made of.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 91 - 105
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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