Winch and Wittgenstein

P. C. Almond

doi:10.1017/S0034412500009616

Winch and Wittgenstein

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008

P. C. Almond

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P. C. Almond: Affiliation:
Lecturer in Religious Studies, Murray Park College of Advanced Education, Adelaide

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In this paper, I shall be concerned to show: (1) that Winch believes that there can be different conceptions of ‘agreement with reality’; (2) that Wittgenstein agrees with this, but emphasizes the difficulty of understanding such conceptions; (3) that Winch realizes this difficulty, and yet still tries to gain understanding of primitive social institutions in terms of their sense of the significance of human life, in terms of the limiting notions of birth, death and sexual relations; (4) that such a notion of the significance of human life cannot be made sense of without an understanding of the concept of agreement with reality which undergirds it; (5) that Winch's position is internally incoherent.

Type: Articles
Information: Religious Studies , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , December 1976 , pp. 473 - 482

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412500009616 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1976

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^{page 473 note 1} Evans-Pritchard, E., ‘Levy-Bruhl's theory of primitive mentality’, in Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts (University of Egypt, 1934)Google Scholar, quoted by Winch, P., ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’, in Rationality, ed. by Wilson, B. (Blackwell, Oxford, 1970), p. 80.Google Scholar

^{page 473 note 2} Ibid. p. 80.

^{page 474 note 1} Ibid. p. 81, cf. p. 82 f.: ‘What Evans-Pritchard wants to be able to say is that the criteria applied in scientific experimentation constitute a true link between our ideas and an independent reality, whereas those characteristic of other systems of thought - in particular, magical methods of thought - do not.’

^{page 474 note 2} Ibid. p. 82.

^{page 474 note 3} Ibid. p. 84.

^{page 474 note 4} Ibid. p. 86.

^{page 475 note 1} Ibid. p. 90.

^{page 475 note 2} Ibid. p. 91.

^{page 475 note 3} Ibid. pp. 91 f.

^{page 475 note 4} Ibid. p. 93.

^{page 476 note 1} Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, Oxford, 1972), 28Google Scholar (subsequently referred to as P.I.) cf. ‘…he might equally well take the name of a person, of which I give an ostensive definition, as that of a colour, or a race, or even of a point of the compass’.

^{page 476 note 2} P.I. 29.

^{page 476 note 3} P.I. 30.

^{page 476 note 4} P.I. 31.

^{page 476 note 5} See P.I. 497, 371, 373, 353.

^{page 476 note 6} Moore, G. E., ‘Proof of an External World’ in idem, Philosophical Papers (Allen and Unwin, London, 1959).Google Scholar He writes, ‘I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, “Here is one hand”, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ”And here is another”’ (pp. 145 f.).

^{page 476 note 7} G. E. Moore, ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, in Ibid. pp. 32–59.

^{page 476 note 8} Wittgenstein, L., On Certainty (Blackwell, Oxford, 1969), 23Google Scholar (subsequently referred to as O.C.); cf. also O.C. 349, 412, 433, 526.

^{page 476 note 9} O.C. 147, 622.

^{page 477 note 1} O.C. 247; cf. 576.

^{page 477 note 2} O.C. 347–50.

^{page 477 note 3} O.C. 151; cf. 341, 403.

^{page 477 note 4} O.C. 210.

^{page 477 note 5} O.C. 577, P.I. p. 224.

^{page 477 note 6} O.C. 156.

^{page 477 note 7} O.C. 112, 116.

^{page 477 note 8} O.C. 136, 138, cf. 185.

^{page 477 note 9} O.C. 214, cf. 577.

^{page 477 note 10} O.C. 494.

^{page 477 note 11} O.C. 167.

^{page 477 note 12} O.C. 298.

^{page 477 note 13} O.C. 514, cf. 69, 83, 419, 515, 614.

^{page 477 note 14} O.C. 142, cf. 144.

^{page 478 note 1} O.C. 152, cf. R.F.M. 1. 116, O.C. 88.

^{page 478 note 2} O.C. 185.

^{page 478 note 3} O.C. 162, cf. 95. (My italics.)

^{page 478 note 4} O.C. 94, cf. 5, 205, 199.

^{page 478 note 5} O.C. 387, cf. 388.

^{page 478 note 6} O.C. 609, cf. 239.

^{page 478 note 7} O.C. 155.

^{page 479 note 1} O.C. 257, 611.

^{page 479 note 2} O.C. 612, cf. 262.

^{page 479 note 3} Wittgenstein's comments on ‘agreement with reality’ (O.C. 214 f.) are not in disagreement with the above statement, although also not in agreement. I have imputed this to Wittgenstein to make the comparison clearer.

^{page 480 note 1} P. Winch, ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’, p. 102.

^{page 480 note 2} MacIntyre, A., ‘Is understanding religion compatible with believing?’, in Rationality, ed. by Wilson, B. (Blackwell, Oxford, 1970), pp. 62–77.Google Scholar

^{page 480 note 3} Winch, P., op.cit. p. 103.Google Scholar

^{page 480 note 4} But cf. R. Horton, ‘African traditional thought and Western science’ in Wilson, , op. cit. pp. 131–71Google Scholar, who argues that African traditional thought is in fact a type of primitive science.

^{page 480 note 5} M. Hollis, ‘Reason and ritual’ in Ibid. p. 231.

^{page 480 note 6} Ibid. p. 235.

^{page 481 note 1} Winch, P., op.cit. p. 103.Google Scholar

^{page 481 note 2} Ibid. p. 105.

^{page 481 note 3} Ibid. p. 104, cf. P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, where Winch gives his definition of ‘understanding’. He writes, ‘“Understanding”, in situations like this, is grasping the point or meaning of what is being done or said’ (p. 115). He further remarks that there can be no understanding (in the sense I am using it) of, for example, the people who sell wood at a price proportionate to the area covered by the wood.

^{page 481 note 4} MacIntyre, A., op.cit. p. 68.Google Scholar

^{page 481 note 5} Winch, P., op.cit. p. 109.Google Scholar

^{page 482 note 1} I say ‘by necessity’ since the original owner of the lock of hair, or that person who was the donor of the picture, might feel she(he) no longer wishes to have a relationship with such a careless person, etc.

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