Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dzt6s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T09:31:01.074Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Belief and Will

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Louis P. Pojman
Louis P. Pojman
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

It is a widely held belief that one can will to believe, disbelieve, and withhold belief concerning propositions. It is sometimes said that we have a duty to believe certain propositions. These theses have had a long and respected history. In one form or another they receive the support of a large number of philosophers and theologians who have written on the relationship of the will to believing. In the New Testament Jesus holds his disciples responsible for their beliefs, reprimands them for doubting, and speaks of the ability to believe as if it were optional. Paul makes it clear that he thinks propositional belief is a necessary condition for salvation. If a man confesses Christ as Lord with his lips and believes in his heart that God has raised him from the dead, he shall be saved (Romans 10: 9f.). The writer of Hebrews implies that unless we have certain propositional beliefs we cannot please God (Heb. II: 6). In the New Testament most cases of pistis (belief, faith) involve more than a propositional attitude. They involve the idea of trust and faithfulness. Nevertheless, a prima facie case for saying that the volitional theses can be found in the New Testament can be made. Forms of volitionalism can be found stated more explicitly in the writings of the early Church, in the writings of Irenaeus, in the Athanasian Creed, and in Augustine. Acquinas describes faith as an act of the intellect moved by the will. Descartes is perhaps the classic example of a volitionalist, holding that if we were not responsible for our beliefs (especially our false beliefs), then God would be - which is tantamount to blasphemy in that it makes God into a deceiver.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , March 1978 , pp. 1 - 14
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

page 1 note 1 ‘Then came the disciples to Jesus apart, and said, Why could not we cast him out? And Jesus said unto them, Because of your unbelief: for verily I say unto you, If ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye shall say unto this mountain, Remove hence to yonder place; and it shall remove; and nothing shall be impossible unto you’ (Matt. 17: 20, 21). Cf. Matt. 21: 21. ‘Jesus said unto him, If thou canot believe, all things are possible to him that believeth’ (Mark 9: 23). ‘And immediately Jesus stretched forth his hand, and caught him, and said to him, O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?’ (Matt. 14: 31).

page 1 note 2 Cf. Hick, John, Faith and Knowledge, p. 46Google Scholar for a discussion of the historical instances of this thesis. Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part II, Q. 4, art. 2. In arriving at my own ideas on volitionalism I am particularly indebted to the discussion in Hick's, Faith and Knowledge, to H. H. Price's ‘Belief and Will’ and Belief, and to Bernard Williams's article, ‘Deciding to Believe’.

page 1 note 3 Cf. Descartes, , Meditations, IV, 137Google Scholar (Penguin edition). After telling us that the will is perfect and unlimited, Descartes locates the cause of error in the misuse of this power. ‘Whence, then, arise my errors? From this fact alone, that the will being much more ample and extended than the under-standing, I do not contain it within the same limits, but extend it also to things I do not understand, and the will being of itself indifferent to such things, very easily goes astray and chooses the bad instead of good, or the false instead of the true, which results in my falling into error or sinning.’ Descartes goes on to say that any matter which is not clear and distinct (knowledge) is subject to a decision of the wi11 as to whether it will be assented to. ‘And this indifference [lack of conclusive reasons which compel the mind to know] extends not only to things of which the understanding has no knowledge, but generally also to all those which it does not discover with perfect clarity at the moment the will is deliberating on them; for, however probable the conjectures may be which make me inclined to form a judgement on something, the mere knowledge that these are only conjectures and not certain and indubitable reasons, suffices to cause me to judge the opposite’ (p. 138). ‘It is in the wrong use of free will that is found the privation which constitutes the form of error [in beliefs].’

page 2 note 1 Philosophical Fragments, p. 104.Google Scholar ‘Faith, surely, implies an act of the will, and moreover not in the same sense as when I say, for instance, that all apprehension implies an act of will: how can I otherwise explain the saying in the N.T. that whatsoever is not of faith is sin (Romans 14: 23)’ Papieren, I, A, 36.

page 2 note 2 ‘The Will to Believe’, pp. 1 f.Google Scholar

page 2 note 3 Insight, A Study of Human Understanding, p. 709.Google Scholar

page 3 note 1 Pascal's Pensées, trans. Stewart, H. F., p. 125 (Random House edition).Google Scholar

page 3 note 2 ‘The Thought: A Logical Inquiry’, in Philosophical Logic, ed. Strawson, P. F.. The translation is by A. and Quinton, M..Google Scholar

page 4 note 1 Belief, series II, lecture 9. This may is also found in Mitchel, Basil (ed.), The Philosophy of Religion, PP. 143–67.Google Scholar

page 4 note 2 Hick, , op. cit. p. 49Google Scholar. I think creative faith is a good thing. It is a psychological manoeuvre aimed at ruling out obstacles to successful action, in order that a possibility can become actual. To take an example, if I am trapped at the edge of a mountain overlooking a yawning gorge, I may conclude that my only chance of escape is to make a leap over the gorge. I calculate that such a leap is only possible if I can completely convince myself that I will succeed in making the leap. Hence I use auto-suggestion to get into a state of mind where I am convinced of the outcome. It might be useful here to make a distinction between first-and second-order beliefs. On a higher or second-order level, I have a belief about what is necessary for me to be successful in some first-order task. What is necessary is a certain belief about that task, which I call a first-order belief. There are hierarchies of beliefs.

page 6 note 1 Cf. Price, H. H., Belief, series I, lectures 8 and 9; series II, lectures 1–3.Google Scholar

page 8 note 1 Wittgenstein, , Philosophical Investigations, part I, no. 213.Google Scholar

page 9 note 1 Price, Belief, p. 238Google Scholar. ‘But even if it were in our power to be wholly rational all the time, it still would not follow that there is anything morally blameworthy about assenting unreasonably (against the evidence or without regard to the evidence) or that we ought to be chastised for doing so. There is nothing wicked about such assents. It is, however, true, and important, that unreasonable assent is contrary to our long-term interest. It is to our long-term interest to believe true propositions rather than false ones. And if we assent reasonably (i.e. in accordance with the evidence), it is likely that in the long run the propositions we believe will be more often true than false.’

page 12 note 1 I am indebted to Anton Hügli for this point.